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Abstract 
The introduction of democracy in many sub-Saharan African countries in the early 1990s 
ushered in a new local governance perspective that is hinged on decentralization, 
emphasizing people-centred and participatory approaches within the Humanist 
development paradigm. At community level, the implementation of this development 
approach posed a challenge of synergizing enduring indigenous local governance 
institutions and the formal institutions. 
Using the case of Sinyala community forest management in rural Malawi, the paper 
argues that the introduction of decentralized community based forest management in 
Sinyala was undermined seriously because it did not adequately engage with and 
incorporate indigenous community governance institutions and community members’ 
expectations. As a result, there have been institutional incompatibilities and 
discontinuities hence disequilibrium between the formal and indigenous local institutions. 
The paper also shows that community development activities, including the community 
based forest management, are not properly synergized in Sinyala community because of 
disjointed initiatives by formal meso-level actors. Given the exogenous nature of the 
decentralized community based forest management regime, much as its introduction was 
participatory, the paper notes the increasing levels of dependency and need for incentives 
in participation among community members in community forest management and indeed 
many community development activities. 
To improve community collective action and development within a decentralized 
framework therefore, this research paper argues that community development efforts 
need to engage with and build on existing indigenous institutions, provide relevant and 
appropriate incentives to boost community participation, build and strengthen cross-
community governance institutions where a common property resource overlaps two or 
more communities, and implement a coherent community development policy that will 
synergize community development efforts from different actors at all levels of 
governance. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The democratization of most countries in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s ushered 
in a new local governance perspective that is hinged on decentralization, emphasizing 
people-centred and participatory approaches within the Humanist development paradigm. 
This decentralized participatory approach has been applied in most development 
endeavours at all governance levels, from national or macro-level, meso-level, to 
community or micro-level governance institutions and processes.  
The people-centred approach to development found empirical expression at community 
level where most development beneficiaries are. This development however happened in 
the context where people at community level have been managing their livelihoods 
irrespective of any State sponsored formal development paradigm. The introduction of 
the decentralized participatory development approach at community level, therefore, 
posed a challenge of blending community indigenous development institutions and 
processes on the one hand, and formal institutions and processes of decentralized 
governance on the other.  
In a decentralized governance system, collective action at community level is embedded 
in a decentralized institutional framework with overlaps between micro- and meso-level 
institutions, and meso- and macro-level institutions. Community collective action, 
therefore, is often shaped by (and sometimes shape) the involvement of the meso-level 
institutions and actors in ways that are beneficial and/or deleterious2. 
One livelihood aspect at community level where community action and the State local 
governance apparatus interact is the management of common property resources (CPRs). 
                                                 
2 N. Paudel et al  “Contextualizing Common Property Systems: Action Research Insights on Forging 
Effective Links Between Forest Commons and ‘Meso’ Layer Governance” 
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001992/00/Paudel_NS.pdf , 2006, (Website Visited on 23rd May 
2007) 
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The study of collective action in CPR management is however skewed towards the 
intricacies of endogenous collective action at the micro-level while paying little attention 
to the meso-level institutions that, in the context of decentralized governance paradigm, 
shape the CPR management options at the micro-level. Studies of collective action in 
CPR management are therefore inadequate in exploring the dynamics of the interface 
between meso-level decentralized governance institutions and micro-level (endogenous) 
governance institutions. 
This research paper attempts to fill this gap by exploring the overlap between meso- and 
micro-level governance institutions in the management of Sinyala community forest in 
Malawi from 19963 to date.  
Based upon the research findings, the paper argues that the introduction of decentralized 
community based forest management in Sinyala by Malawi government through the 
Department of Forestry was undermined seriously because it did not adequately engage 
with and incorporate indigenous community governance institutions and community 
members’ expectations. As a result, there have been institutional incompatibilities and 
discontinuities hence disequilibrium between the formal and indigenous local institutions. 
The paper also shows that community development activities, including the community 
based forest management, are not properly synergized in Sinyala community because of 
disjointed initiatives by meso-level actors that even defy the set formal institutional 
framework. Given the exogenous nature of the decentralized community based forest 
management regime, much as its introduction was participatory, the paper notes the 
increasing levels of dependency and need for incentives in participation among 
community members in community forest management and indeed many community 
development activities. 
To improve community collective action and development within a decentralized 
framework therefore, this research paper argues that community development efforts 
need to engage with and build on existing indigenous institutions, provide relevant and 
                                                 
3 The year 1996 is chosen because that is when the National Forest Policy of Malawi under the rubric of 
decentralization governance paradigm was initiated (see Government of Malawi (1996) National Forest 
Policy of Malawi Lilongwe, Ministry of Natural Resources) 
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appropriate incentives to boost community participation, build and strengthen cross-
community governance institutions where a CPR overlaps two or more communities, and 
implement a coherent community development policy that will synergize community 
development efforts from different actors at all levels of governance. 
1.1 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND: COMMUNITY BASED 
(MICRO-LEVEL) DEVELOPMENT 
This section sets the context of the study. Collective action within the decentralized 
governance system, which is the hub of this study, is here located in the broad context of 
community development. To elucidate this realm, we start by briefly tracing the evolution 
of development paradigms, before presenting community development as it unfolds in 
Malawian context, and the importance of forest resource management in Malawi’s 
community development. 
1.1.1 Evolution of Development Paradigms 
Development is one of the elusive concepts especially that it encompasses the whole 
gamut of human life. Development entails improving human conditions such as 
capabilities and well-being; power relations and organization such as participation and 
empowerment; domains such as civil society and market; and values such as human 
rights and sustainability4. In simplistic terms therefore, development can be said to entail 
change in people’s lives for the better. 
How to facilitate this positive change in human lives has however been a critical yet 
elusive quest. The short overview of the development paradigms below highlights the 
evolution of development thinking that reflects efforts to pin down workable 
development strategy since the emergence of the Development field in 1940s. 
 
 
                                                 
4 See Robert Chambers “Ideas for Development: Reflecting Forwards,” IDS Working Paper 238, Institute 
of Development Studies, 2004 
 3  
 
Modernization Paradigm 
After the end of World War II, the Modernization development paradigm emerged from 
the articulation of different schools of thought from developed countries. The essence of 
this paradigm was however Rostow’s stages of growth that presented the developed 
countries’ growth path as progressing from traditional society; pre-conditions for take-
off; take-off; drive to maturity; to age of high mass consumption5. To become developed, 
it was therefore conceived that developing countries should simply imitate the developed 
countries by following these five steps. 
This development model however proved to be naïve and ineffective as its application in 
developing countries soon after independence showed that development is context 
specific and might not progress in linear fashion6. 
Dependency Paradigm 
The Dependency paradigm arose as a response to the failure of the Modernization 
approach to address the underdevelopment of the Third World countries. The central 
argument in Dependency theories is that underdevelopment of Third World countries is a 
result of the countries’ structural relationship with the capitalist North. The North 
exploits natural resources from the Third World thereby making the Third World 
economies dependent on the economies of the North7. The solution to underdevelopment 
therefore lies in the Third World countries cutting economic links with the North and 
becoming self-dependent. 
                                                 
5 W. Rostow (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-Communist Manifesto London, Cambridge 
University Press 
6 Also see Francois Theron (Ed) (2008) The Development Change Agent – A Micro-level Approach to 
Development Pretoria, Van Schaik, p.6 
7 See for instance Andrew Webster (1990) Introduction to the Sociology of Development London, 
Macmillan Press Ltd 
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Just as with the Modernization paradigm, the Dependency paradigm has been criticised 
as prescriptive in nature and proposing oversimplified macro solutions to the 
development process of developing countries8. 
Humanist Paradigm 
The failure of the above two paradigms led to the growing support for a new 
development strategy that was based on the recognition of people-centred approach, 
especially the micro-level development, that calls for active participation of people 
affected by any development initiative. This Humanist development paradigm that 
emerged in 1980s holds that “…development is more than just economics; it also 
represents institutional, cultural, political and psychological issues”9. Development 
strategy therefore needs an integrated holistic approach aimed at improving people’s 
livelihoods. 
One challenge facing the Humanist paradigm is that people’s participation is often 
facilitated by (external) development agents who often are biased by their personal and 
institutional worldviews that may be conflicting with the outlook and needs of the target 
communities. This has resulted in some development initiatives failing to achieve the 
desired impact10. 
Despite this challenge, it is within this Humanist paradigm that this study locates the 
debate on collective action within the decentralized institutional matrix in community 
development. This is meaningful in the context of the people-centred approach and the 
micro-level emphasis of the Humanist model. The whole decentralization initiative in 
most sub-Saharan African countries that are in the process of democratization is also 
couched in this people-centred development model. It should also be noted that the 
development agents’ biasness in development initiatives has been, and still is, an area 
                                                 
8 Francois Theron (2008) Op. Cit. 
9 Ibid, p.7 
10 Ibid 
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where a lot of academics and development practitioners are putting effort to improve the 
approach11. 
1.1.2 Community Development in Malawi 
The evolution of community development in Malawi is succinctly summarized by 
Chinsinga and Kayuni in their situational analysis study aimed at informing the 
formulation of community development policy in Malawi12. They analyze the evolution 
in three historical stages: the colonial period; the one-party era; and the multi-party 
democracy era. This paper uses the same approach. 
The Colonial Period (1891-1963) 
During the pre-colonial and colonial periods, community development in Malawi, then 
Nyasaland, can be conceptualized within the local community agrarian cooperation 
system called Thangata13. Traditionally, village chiefs would mobilize community 
members to help in the gardens of those community members who could not manage to 
work on their own. Apart from the legitimacy of the tradition chiefs in facilitating this 
system, the incentive was that this help would be reciprocated if those who assist find 
themselves in a similar situation14.  
After colonization of Nyasaland in 1891, the colonial government took advantage of this 
system by forcing community members, through chiefs, to work on government 
prescribed environmental and other community activities such as construction of storm 
drains and other soil-protection measures15. Thangata, in the form of the traditional 
reciprocal labour, and the colonial ‘forced labour’, can be said to be the origins of 
community development in Malawi. The colonial forced labour however lacked 
                                                 
11 See for instance Damien Kingsbury “Community Development” in Damien Kingsbury et al (Eds) Key 
Issues in Development New York, Pelgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 221-242 
12 Blessings Chinsinga and Happy Kayuni “Community Development in Malawi: A Situation Analysis 
Report” Report Submitted to Skills Development and Income Generation Project, Ministry of Women and 
Child Development Lilongwe, February 2008 
13 Thangata literally means ‘assist’. 
14 See J. Kandawire (1969) District Community Development Programme: Final Report of Results of 
1968/69 Internal Evaluation. Department of Community Development Publications 
15 The worst form of Thangata was when European ‘land lords’ recruited Africans to work on their farms 
for a meagre pay. See Blessings Chinsinga and Happy Kayuni (2008) Op. Cit. p.6 
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legitimacy to the extent that its popular opposition constituted the fight for political 
independence during this period. 
The One-Party Era (1964-1993) 
After independence in 1964, community development was generally conceived to entail 
participation of community members in efforts to improve their livelihoods; and 
government provision of technical and financial support in ways that encourage 
community initiative, self-help and mutual help16. This conceptualization saw the 
establishment of the Department of Community Development in the Office of the 
President and Cabinet, focusing initially on social welfare provision, sports, community 
centres, women’s clubs and youth development. 
The institutional structure of community development was put in place in this period. In 
order to enhance community participation, the Malawi government in 1967 set up District 
Development Committees (DDCs) with structures extending to village levels. These 
structures were responsible for rural infrastructure development as well as coordinating, 
facilitating and promoting self-help spirit and culture. At village level, community 
development projects were supposed to be planned and implemented by Village 
Development Committee (VDC) chaired by the village head. The Area Action Group 
(AAG) chaired by the chief or Traditional Authority coordinated community 
development at area level17. 
The conceptualization of community development as articulated in at least government 
policy documents during the one-party era, shows, ironically, considerable appreciation 
for the value of people-centred participatory approaches to development. However, the 
practice of community development was over-shadowed by the highly centralized one-
party system. This left the central government as the main driver of community 
development processes.  
                                                 
16Ibid 
17 ‘Area’ here is technically referring to the administrative domain encompassing a collection of several 
villages and institutionally located between the village and district levels. Ibid 
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The Multi-party Era (1993 to date) 
When the one-party system was replaced with multi-party democracy in 1993, the 
paradigm of people-centred participatory governance was given new impetus. The 1996 
Decentralization Policy and the subsequent 1998 Local Government Act provided for 
local community development institutions that were to be responsive to and driven by 
community needs. The involvement of communities in driving community development 
agenda and implementation was envisaged to empower the communities to take charge of 
issues affecting their lives18. 
Local development institutions aimed at promoting such democratic principles as 
accountability, transparency and participation of the people in development processes, 
were put in place from the national, meso-, to community levels19. 
It is within this decentralized community development framework that this research paper 
discusses community collective action using the case of Sinyala community forest 
management in Malawi. 
The next section gives the context of forest resources in community development in 
Malawi. 
1.1.3 Forest Resources, Poverty, and Community Development in Malawi 
Malawi is one of the least developed countries with more than 60% of the population 
living below the US$1 per day poverty line20. The Malawi population is estimated to 
stand at 11.4 million with a population density of about 119 people per square 
kilometre21. The average population growth rate is 2% per year and the illiteracy rate 
stands at 37%22. 
                                                 
18 See for instance Malawi Government (2000) National Decentralisation Policy. Lilongwe, 
Decentralization Secretariat 
19 See figure 3 on page 54 
20 S. Kainja (2000) Forestry Outlook Studies in Africa (FOSA): Malawi FOSA 
21Government of Malawi (2005) Malawi Demographic and Health Survey 2004 Zomba, National Statistical 
Office  
22 Ibid 
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It is estimated that 94% of the Malawi population relies on wood fuel for household 
energy, up from 90% in 199623. Rural communities who make up more than 90% of 
Malawi’s population rely to a large extent on forest resources for their daily needs in the 
form of wood fuel, construction materials, agricultural tools, medicinal plants, and, in 
some instances, bush meat and other foods.  
In her study in southern Malawi24, Monica Fisher showed that there is a high level of 
dependence on forest resources, proxied by approximately 30% of household income. 
She further showed that access to forest income reduced income inequality at the study 
sites25.  
Even in urban areas where less than 10% of Malawi’s population resides, the use of wood 
fuel for household energy (e.g. charcoal) is increasing as evidenced by the wood fuel 
consumption increase from 90% to 94% of the population from 1996 to early 2000s26. 
The pressure on forest resources is heightened by the high population growth rate of 
about 2% per annum. By 2009, Malawi government had not yet come up with any 
affordable alternative source of household energy27.  
The above evidence shows that a significant part of the livelihood of most Malawians 
depends on forest resources. Efforts to curb poverty in Malawi therefore should include 
sustainable forest management. 
Deforestation however is continually increasing. For example, it is reported that, over a 
20 year period from 1972 to 1992, Malawi’s forest resources were reduced by more than 
half (57%) of their size, with an estimated annual deforestation rate of 2.8%. The 
                                                 
23 Ibid; S. Kainja (2000) Op. Cit.  
24 Southern region of Malawi is the biggest (both in area and population) of the three administrative regions 
of Malawi. 
25 M. Fisher ‘Household Welfare and Forest Dependence in Southern Malawi’ Environment and 
Development Economics Vol. 9, 2004, Cambridge University Press, pp135-154 
26 Government of Malawi (2005) Op. Cit.; Kainja (2000) Op. Cit. 
27 Very few Malawians use electricity as the main source of household energy. See Malawi News Agency 
(Mana) ‘Kaunda Challenges Communities to Protect Forests’ in The Nation Newspaper, 27 January 2009. 
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deforestation rate between 1990 and 2000 was slightly lower (2.4%) which however is 
three times greater than Pan-African average28.  
This deforestation has happened due to, among other things, agricultural expansion, wood 
fuel gathering, commercial logging and large scale industrial wood fuel use for tobacco 
curing, lime burning, brick making, and the growing population coupled with lack of 
sustainable CPR management strategies29. 
Recognizing the salience of forestry in poverty reduction in Malawi, the Malawi Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (MPRSP) of 2002 includes forestry as a key element in the 
government poverty reduction strategy30. 
The indispensability of forest resources in the livelihoods of most Malawians, therefore, 
makes the study of forest management ideal in understanding community collective 
action especially considering that most forest resources are (perceived to be) communally 
owned31. It is in this context that this paper uses the case of Sinyala community forest 
management to explore the dynamics of collective action and community development 
within the decentralized institutional framework. 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This study set out to explore the interface between community self-organization and 
formal local government institutions in community forest resource management. As can 
be appreciated from section 1.1.3 above, forest resources are an indispensable part of 
Malawian livelihood. Prior to formalization of decentralization policy under the 
                                                 
28 D. Slunge, Malawi – Environment Policy Brief: Point of departure for a discussion of poverty and 
environmentally sustainable development (November, 2004)  
http://www.hgu.gu.se/files/nationalekonomi/eeu/helpdesk/env%20policy%20brief%20malawi.pdf  (website 
visited 1st May 2008) 
29 Government of Malawi (1996) National Forest Policy of Malawi Lilongwe, Ministry of Natural 
Resources 
30 See for instance Government of Malawi, Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, April, 2002; 
Government of Malawi, Ministry of Mines, Natural Resources and Environment, Department of Forestry, 
Standards and Guidelines for Participatory Forestry in Malawi- Improving Forest Governance – 
Improving Rural Livelihoods, Lilongwe, November 2005 
31 As will be appreciated in chapter 4, much as the Malawi government policy prior to 1996 stipulated that 
all forests belonged to government, some communities have been claiming ownership right to many 
community forests. 
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democratic dispensation in 1996, Malawian local communities had self-organization 
institutions to manage the forest resources albeit under the overall authority of 
government general rules on forest management. This arrangement produced mixed 
results - in some areas forest management was a failure while in others it was a success.  
The decentralization drive after 1996 has seen community self-organization institutions in 
forest resource management being mainstreamed into the formal local governance system 
under the rubric of people-centred participatory development paradigm. Evidence 
however shows that most community forest resources are still deteriorating despite 
efforts to decentralize governance of the resources32. This is a paradox especially 
considering that the introduction of decentralized forest management was aimed at 
curbing deforestation33. To understand this irony, the research informing this paper 
therefore aimed to explore the dynamics of the interface between micro-level and meso-
level governance institutions in forest resource management in the decentralized set-up. 
This was on the understanding that the meso-level institutions act as agents between 
national level policies and resources on the one hand, and community (micro-level) needs 
and feedback on the other. The research further analysed the implications of this 
institutional arrangement and explored optimal institutional set-up for sustainable 
community development.  
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question that this study set out to address was: how are indigenous 
community institutions and formal local governance institutions synergized in the 
decentralized community forest management? In trying to address this question, the 
research study also attempted to address the following sub-questions: what are the 
institutional objectives, modus operandi, and outcomes of indigenous community 
institutions and formal local governance institutions in forest resources management? 
                                                 
32 See section 1.1.3 above citing deforestation evidence from D. Slunge ‘Malawi – Environment Policy 
Brief: Point of departure for a discussion of poverty and environmentally sustainable development 
(November, 2004)’  
http://www.hgu.gu.se/files/nationalekonomi/eeu/helpdesk/env%20policy%20brief%20malawi.pdf  (website 
visited 1st May 2008)) 
33 See for instance Government of Malawi (2003) Community Based Forest Management: A Supplement to 
the National Forest Policy of Malawi, 1996 Zomba, Malawi Government Printers 
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And what is the optimal institutional synergy that can promote sustainable community 
forest management and livelihood specifically and community development in general? 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The overall aim of the study was to explore the dynamics and implications of the 
interface between formal local governance and community self-organization institutions 
in community development. The community development issue under focus in this study 
was the management of forest resources in Sinyala community in central region of 
Malawi. Specifically, the study aimed at: 
• Exploring the nature of the link between traditional/indigenous  institutional 
structures and formal local governance institutions in forest resource management 
• Assessing the effectiveness of the interface between indigenous and formal 
governance institutions in forest resource management 
• Comparing and contrasting the pre-decentralization period (before 1996) and the 
post-decentralization period in terms of local governance institutions and 
effectiveness of forest resource management 
• Exploring lessons for optimal institutional arrangement for effective forest 
resource management at community level 
1.5 RESEARCH JUSTIFICATION 
As indicated in section 1.4 above, this research study aimed to explore the interface, in 
forest resource management, between the micro-level institutions and the meso-level 
institutions that lie above the micro-level institutions but below the macro-level 
institutions. 
There are theoretical, empirical and application rationales that justify this study.  
At theoretical level, literature review shows that studies on collective action in CPR 
management is skewed towards community level institutions and behaviours while 
paying little attention to meso-level institutions and their influence on CPR 
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management34. The influence of meso-level institutions in CPR management becomes 
even critical in the context of decentralized governance system where the institutions 
simultaneously relay government policies and resources to the micro-level on the one 
hand, and channel community needs and feedback to the macro-level on the other. This 
development agent function therefore shapes the CPR management choice set at the 
micro-level35. In this context, studies on collective action in CPR management are 
inadequate in exploring the dynamics of the interface between meso-level decentralized 
governance institutions and micro-level (endogenous) governance institutions. 
This research paper therefore attempts to fill this gap by exploring the interface and 
implications between meso- and micro-level governance institutions in the management 
of community forest resources in particular, and community development in general. 
There is also empirical evidence that justifies the study of forest resource management in 
Malawi. As explained in section 1.1.3 above, forestry is one of the key factors 
contributing towards the livelihood of rural Malawians36 who make up more than 90% of 
Malawi population, and more than 60% of which live below the US$1 per day poverty 
line37. During the colonial period from 1891 to 1963, almost all Malawians relied on 
forest resources for the better part of their livelihood, notably wood fuel energy and 
construction materials. This prompted the colonial government in 1926 to institute 
Village Forest Area (VFA) scheme that provided each village with an area of forest 
woodland38. During the one-party era from 1964 to 1993, forestry formed a significant 
unit of local government. This is because forestry not only provided a major source of 
                                                 
34 See for example Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Groups and the Theory of 
Groups, Cambridge, MA, Havard University Press; Garret Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons” Science 
Vol. 162, 1968, pp. 1234-48; Eleanor Ostrom (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of 
Institutions for Collective Action Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Eleanor Ostrom (2000) 
‘Reformulating the Commons’ in Swiss Political Science Review Vol 6, No. 1, pp.29-52; Sara Gillinson 
“Why Cooperate? A Multi-Disciplinary Study of Collective Action”  Working Paper No. 234, London, 
Overseas Development Institute, 2004 
35 See for instance N. Paudel et al  “Contextualizing Common Property Systems: Action Research Insights 
on Forging Effective Links Between Forest Commons and ‘Meso’ Layer Governance” 
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001992/00/Paudel_NS.pdf , 2006, (Website Visited on 23rd May 
2007) 
36 M. Fisher (2004) Op. Cit.; D. Slunge (2004) Op. Cit.; S. Kainja (2000) Op. Cit; 
37 S. Kainja (2000) Op. Cit; Government of Malawi (1996) Op. cit. 
38 See E. Kalipeni, and L. Zulu ‘From Top-Down to Bottom-Up: The Difficult Case of the Bantyre City 
Fuelwood Project’ Journal of Southern African Studies Vol. 28, No. 1, Special Issue: Malawi, March 2002 
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energy to Malawians, but also provided revenue to local and central government39. By 
2004, forestry had been shown to contribute about 30% of household incomes and that 
94% of Malawians relied on forest wood energy with no affordable alternative in sight40. 
However, despite the introduction of decentralized community forest governance in 1996 
aimed at decreasing deforestation and encouraging afforestation, deforestation has been 
steadily increasing threatening the very livelihoods of Malawians41. Analysis, lessons and 
conclusions drawn from the Sinyala community forest case study will therefore 
contribute towards efforts to find an optimal governance institutional arrangement and 
practice in community forest resource management and community development in 
Malawi. This will go a long way in improving the livelihood of the majority of 
Malawians. 
At application level, this research study is justified because it uses a case study approach. 
This approach is deemed ideal because it facilitates an empirically deep and holistic 
contextual understanding of the topic under study. This will help to empirically test the 
theoretical perspectives on decentralized community forest resource management in 
terms of descriptive accuracy or general applicability42. The case study will also provide 
analytical insights on decentralized community development efforts, applicable not only 
in Malawi, but also in similar cases elsewhere, especially where indigenous community 
development institutions are being integrated in formal decentralized systems. 
1.6 SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
This research covered community development institutions at micro- and meso-levels in 
as far as they interact in the management of forest resources in Sinyala area in Lilongwe, 
Malawi. The collective action implication of this interaction was also explored among 
Sinyala community members. Macro-level institutions were only referred to in as far as 
                                                 
39 Ibid 
40 See section 1.1.3 above. 
41 See section 1.1.3 above 
42 See J. Chima  ‘What’s the Utility of Case Study Method for Social Science Research? A Response to 
critiques from the quantitative/statistical perspective.’ Paper presented to the Annual Congress of the 
American Political Science Association, September 2005 
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they directly affected the operation of meso- and micro-levels institutions and community 
members. 
1.7 METHODOLOGY 
This study used a case study approach to explore the research question. As Peter Evans 
puts it, case studies take an ‘eclectic messy center’ approach to social science 
methodology43. This implies that, the case study uses the guiding theoretical perspective 
as lenses to identify what is interesting and significant about the case under study. At the 
same time, the study uses the case to test the applicability of the theoretical perspective. 
Thus, neither the theory nor the case is treated as sacrosanct. This approach therefore 
avoids both the positivist reduction that would reduce the case to natural sciences and 
discount hermeneutic dimension, and the humanist reduction that suppresses the 
scientific dimension of trying to find empirically verifiable general laws44. Discussion of 
findings from the case study therefore helps identify both strengths and deficiencies of 
the theoretical perspective in terms of descriptive accuracy or general applicability45. The 
discussion must therefore refer back and forth to the guiding theory and the case with the 
ultimate aim of gaining analytical insights that can be extrapolated to other similar cases. 
Based upon this understanding, this study used the theoretical perspective on community 
self-organization and local governance in community development, as discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3, as a guide to what is interesting and significant about the Sinyala case. 
At the same time, the study used the Sinyala empirical case to test the applicability of the 
theoretical perspective. 
The use of a case study approach in this study to explore issues of self-organization and 
local governance compares favourably with other similar studies in this field.  For 
instance, Robert Wade uses a case study approach to study collective action in village 
communities in South India46. Most of Elinor Ostrom’s studies on the commons and 
                                                 
43 Peter Evans as quoted in Jugdep Chima  (2005) Op. Cit. p6 
44 Michael Burawoy as paraphrased in Jugdep Chima (2005) Op. Cit.: 7 
45 Jugdep Chima (2005) Op. Cit. 
46 See Robert Wade (1994) Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India 
San Francisco, ICS Press 
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community collective action, the theses of which are extensively used in chapters 2 and 3, 
are also based on case studies47. Arun Agrawal concluded that the task of generating a 
list of generic conditions under which users of common property resources self-organize 
is a difficult and futile attempt. He therefore proposed, among other things, that context 
specific case studies are ideal for studying the commons and community self-
organization. 
The fact that this study used a common research approach to other studies on the 
commons and community self-organization implies that we can confidently apply the 
conclusions drawn from this study to other similar circumstances in Africa and other 
Third World countries. 
Within the case study approach, data collection triangulated different qualitative methods 
to gather data from different sources. Triangulation in social research entails the use of a 
mixture of different methods and/or data sources to explore a research question48. 
Triangulation strengthens a research design in that it enables a study to explore the study 
phenomena from different angles hence getting a better holistic multi-dimensional picture 
than in a uni-dimensional survey. 
The research study used both methodological and data triangulation. 
1.7.1 Data Collection 
The following data collection methods were used: 
Desk Research 
Desk research of secondary data is one of the most convenient ways of collecting data as 
it does not necessarily demand that the investigator conducts interviews directly with 
research participants. One of the advantages is that a collection of relevant documents can 
                                                 
47 See for instance Elinor Ostrom “Reformulating the Commons” in Swiss Political Science Review, Vol. 6 
No. 1, 2000, pp. 29-52; Elinor Ostrom (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
48 Michael Patton (1990) Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods London, SAGE Publications, p. 
187-9 
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ensure the availability of relevant information that was gathered using wide and 
comprehensive research studies that the investigator might not have been able to handle 
both cognitively and logistically.  
The fact that research participants are not directly interviewed also minimizes biases 
emanating from research participants’ reactivity49. 
One major weakness of desk research, unlike in other methods involving direct 
interviews and observation, is that the investigator has no control over the primary 
sources, responses and situations. This implies that data collection and analysis is 
restricted to what has been documented. Unrecorded events, for example, no matter how 
important they might be in the context of the guiding theory or otherwise, cannot be 
studied50. 
Based upon this understanding, the study employed desk research method to collect 
secondary data. Documents that included manuals, laws and policies on Malawi local 
governance were studied and analysed. Much as desk research was an on-going exercise, 
the findings informed some specific themes that were further explored in in-depth 
interviews (IDIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs). The IDIs and the FGDs further 
helped to off-set the major weakness of desk research as highlighted above. 
In-depth Interviews 
IDIs are one-to-one qualitative interviews that offer flexibility to gain a depth 
understanding of the issue under study, while at the same time provide for a systematic, 
guided and structured interview by using a semi-structured interview guide51. This is an 
ideal data collection method for sensitive topics and other types of research where it 
would be difficult to observe the research participants or interview them in a group. 
                                                 
49 See N.L. Neuman (2006) Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches Boston, 
Pearson International 
50 See S. Sarantakos (1998) Social Research London, MacMillan Press Ltd. 
51 See for example Michael Patton (1990) Op. Cit. 
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Typical of direct interviews, one major disadvantage of IDIs is the biased responses from 
the interviewees as they react to perceived expectations of the interviewer. 
In this study, apart from the need to gain in-depth understanding of collective action and 
community development in a decentralized set-up, IDIs were used because some 
interviewees, like government officials, had restricted time and could not be brought in a 
group interview.  
The potential biases due to reactivity of the interviewees were minimized by the 
interviewer’s neutrality throughout the data collection process. For example, the 
interviewer was not judgmental when conducting the interviews. 
IDIs were conducted with district assembly52 officials, community leaders and 
gatekeepers most of whom are in positions of influence. The interviews sourced first 
hand information from local government officials and community leaders on the 
interaction between the local government and community institutions in community 
development in general and forest management in particular. This provided balanced 
information from both the government and the community perspectives. 
To recruit IDI participants, purposeful sampling was used based on the position of a 
potential interviewee in line with the key institutions as per the study’s conceptual 
framework53. Seven IDIs were conducted in total. Table 1 below summarizes the 
interviews conducted, including the IDIs.  
Focus Group Interviews 
FGD is one of the most effective qualitative data collection methods. This is because, 
during group interviews, as respondents talk to each other, the interviewer is able to get 
the social construction and context of the topic under investigation. The FGDs also 
                                                 
52 A district assembly is a local government office/forum that coordinates local development at district 
level. 
53 See chapter 3 
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ensure valid and reliable data as group discussion provide some checks and balances that 
weed out extreme views54. 
As in IDIs, respondents’ reactivity and subsequent biases are the major potential 
disadvantages. Again, the interviewer in this study maintained neutrality throughout the 
data collection process to minimize reactivity biases. 
Convenient sampling of all research participants in each of the Sinyala two villages was 
used to recruit FGD participants. Four focus group interviews were conducted. Table 1 
below summarizes the breakdown of interviews conducted during the study, including 
focus group interviews. 
Each group consisted of about 9 to 12 people (men and women) from the age of 18 years. 
This age minimum was chosen considering that community members are often 
considered active citizens from the age of 18 years55.  
The in-depth and focus group interviews were guided by a discussion guide of themes 
and questions that were drafted in line with the theoretical and conceptual perspective 
and objectives of this study56. The interviews were however fluid to the extent that the 
facilitator was at liberty to probe and follow-up systematically on emerging issues within 
the context of forest management, community development, and interaction between 
local government and community institutions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 Michael Patton (1990) Op. Cit. pp.335-7 
55 For instance, the voting minimum age in Malawi is 18years (Constitution of the Republic of Malawi 
(1999)  Section 77 subsection 2(b)) 
56 See appendix on page 116 ff. 
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Table 1: Interviews conducted 
 
Level Interviewee(s) Type of 
Interview 
No. of 
Interviews 
Remarks 
District 
(Meso-level) 
Director of 
Planning and 
Development 
(DPD) 
In-depth 
Interview 
1 The DPD is an executive 
member of the District 
Assembly 
 
” 
District Forest 
Officer (DFO) 
 
” 
1 The DFO is also an 
executive member of the 
District Assembly 
Area (Meso- 
and Micro-
levels) 
Forest Technical 
Assistant (FTA) 
 
 
” 
1 The FTA is also a 
member of Area 
Executive Committee 
(AEC) which is a sub-
committee of Area 
Development Committee 
(ADC) 
Community 
(Micro-
level) 
Group Village 
Headman (GVH) 
 
 
” 
1 The GVH is also an ex-
officio member of the 
ADC and the Village 
Development Committee 
(VDC) 
 
” 
Village Headman 
(VH) 
 
” 
1 The VH is also an ex-
officio member of VDC 
 
” 
Village 
Development 
Committee (VDC) 
Chairman 
 
 
” 
1  
 
” 
Village Natural 
Resource 
Management 
Committee 
(VNRMC) 
Secretary 
 
 
 
” 
1  
 
” 
Sinyala Group 
Village 
participants 
Focus 
Group 
2  
 
” 
Sinyala Joshua 
Village 
participants 
 
” 
2  
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Total number of In-depth Interviews 7  
Total number of Focus Group Interviews 4 Each focus group 
interview consisted of 
about 9 – 12 
participants. Thus, all 
FGDs had a minimum 
of 36 participants. 
Including IDIs, the 
research had about 43 
participants 
 
1.7.2 Data Processing, Analysis and Reporting 
All interviews (in-depth and group interviews) were recorded electronically. Since the 
interviews were conducted in the local language in which the interviewees were 
comfortable (Chichewa), the recorded interviews were translated into English and 
transcribed verbatim. This process ensured that the analysis captured the nuanced details 
of the responses and that the investigator’s biases were minimized. 
Using ATLAS ti computer software57 and manual analysis, the transcripts were analysed 
thematically. Michael Patton refers to this type of analysis as content analysis; where 
responses are coded basing on meaning, and further grouped into themes emerging from 
the data, but within the theoretical framework and objectives of the study58. This type of 
analysis also gives room for emerging themes that might fall outside the theoretical 
framework but are deemed informative by the investigator. 
Similarly, in analysing documents, facts, trends, themes and practices that reflect 
interaction between community structures and meso-level institutions in community 
development activities were extracted. This was guided by the theoretical perspective 
while at the same time being open to ‘unexpected’ findings. 
The themes and emerging models from the IDIs, FGDs and documents were written up 
and the narratives were supported by specific facts and direct quotes where necessary. 
                                                 
57 ATLAS ti is a computer software used to analyse qualitative data 
58 Michael Patton (1990) Op. Cit. p381 
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These findings are presented in chapter 4 and are discussed in chapter 5 guided by the 
theoretical and conceptual framework and the study objectives. This analytical approach 
illuminated theoretically salient findings from the case study. At the same time, the 
empirical findings put to test the applicability of the theoretical basis. The findings, 
discussion and lessons gained from this study, much as they may not be generalizable in 
all cases, will give analytical insights that can be extrapolated in other similar 
circumstances. 
1.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The basis of ethical considerations in social research is that the rights of research 
participants whose (private) domains are intruded by research investigators, who often 
are strangers, must be protected59. Informed by this understanding, the investigator 
sought ethical approval of the proposed research from the Human Research Ethics 
Committee (Non-Medical) of the University of the Witwatersrand and the approval to 
conduct this research was granted under protocol number H080712. The investigator 
further sought approval to conduct research from the district assembly officials in 
Lilongwe, Malawi, and from community traditional leaders at the study site. 
During the process of the research, the following ethical principles were adhered to: 
1.8.1 Informed Consent 
Informed consent to participate in a research exercise is considered a fundamental ethical 
principle in social research60. The investigator in this study explained the overall aim of 
the study to all research participants. Their understanding of the research aim ensured that 
the research participants’ permission given to the investigator to conduct the interviews 
was informed.  
In terms of document research, the investigator explained the overall aim of the study to 
authors or custodians of the documents in cases where the documents were sourced 
                                                 
59 N.L. Neuman (2006) Op. Cit. 
60 Ibid, p135 
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directly from the authors or custodians. In addition, relevant copyright protocols were 
strictly adhered to. 
1.8.2 Confidentiality 
In this research, data collected through individual and group interviews is not linked back 
directly to the personal details of the interviewees. This is in adherence to the ethical 
principles of privacy, anonymity and confidentiality61. The investigator’s adherence to 
these principles was mentioned to all interviewees before interviews were conducted as 
part of information they needed to know before giving their consent to participate in the 
research exercise. 
The ethical principles highlighted above did not only help solve the problem of reactivity 
(and subsequent response bias) of research participants that is often associated with direct 
data collection methods, but also ensured that respondents’ rights to information, privacy 
and confidentiality were respected. 
1.9 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
One of the strengths of this research study is the data triangulation approach that was 
used. As indicated in section 1.7 above, this strengthened the validity and reliability of 
the data and subsequent analysis and conclusion in that the phenomenon under study was 
looked at from different dimensions. 
One major limitation was that the investigator was working under tight deadlines to 
collect and analyse the data and produce a report within the 2008 academic year. This 
was compounded by the fact that the investigator was residing in Johannesburg, South 
Africa while the fieldwork was to be conducted in Lilongwe, Malawi. This posed 
logistical challenges and limited not only the time for collecting data, but also the number 
of interviews conducted. 
Within these limitations however, every effort was made to maintain the quality of the 
research process. 
                                                 
61 Ibid, p138 
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1.10 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The following chapters flow as follows: in chapter 2, I review the literature on collective 
action and community self-organization. In chapter 3, I review literature on local 
government and the link between contemporary community action and formal local 
governance. A conceptual framework is developed in the process that is used in 
presenting and discussing findings in chapters 4 and 5 respectively. Chapter 6 closes with 
a conclusion and recommendations drawn from this paper.  
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CHAPTER 2 
COMMUNITY SELF-ORGANIZATION AND COMMON 
PROPERTY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
It has been widely argued that, to ensure sustainable and effective common property 
resource management and community development, communities must have autonomy to 
manage the resources without undue external interference. This autonomous atmosphere, 
in the context of CPRs that are indispensable to community appropriators, will result in 
spontaneous emergence of order and cooperation in the management of the resources, the 
process of which by definition is community self-organization62. 
This chapter unpacks the concept of community self-organization in the context of CPR 
management. The literature reviewed in this chapter shows that, despite challenges of 
collective action, communities have the potential to self-organize and manage their 
resources, especially when their livelihoods depend on the resources in one way or the 
other. Analysis of the literature however shows that, much as some scholarly work 
acknowledges the presence and influence of formal governance institutions in community 
self-organization discourse, the literature rarely unpacks the dynamics of the interface 
between local community (self-organization) institutions and formal ‘outside’ 
institutions. The literature is heavily skewed towards community organization as almost 
an autonomous phenomenon. This is one gap that this research paper is attempting to fill. 
2.1 COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Most literature on community self-organization is located in Common Property 
Resources and Collective Action discourse. Classical theories basically highlight a 
pessimistic perspective in collective action whereas most contemporary theories, while 
                                                 
62 See for instance Elinor Ostrom “Reformulating the Commons” in Swiss Political Science Review, Vol. 6 
No. 1, 2000, pp. 29-52; Louise Comfort, “Self-Organization in Complex Systems” Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 4 No. 3, 1994, pp. 393 - 410 
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acknowledging problems of collective action, paint an optimistic picture on community 
self-organization. 
2.1.1 Classical Theories of Collective Action: The Problem of Collective 
Action 
In his seminal work on the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ in 1968, Garret Hardin argues 
that, when many people have access rights to the same resources whose benefits can be 
enjoyed exclusively, there is a high potential for each individual to overuse and under-
invest in the management of the resource63. This comes about as the people scramble to 
maximize benefits while at the same time minimize management costs.  
This problem of collective action applies to natural resource systems used by multiple 
individuals, conventionally referred to as common-pool or common property resources 
(CPRs). The natural resources must satisfy two basic attributes if they are to qualify to be 
CPRs: the first one is that consumption must be rivalrous; and the second one is that it 
must be costly to exclude other individuals from partaking in the benefits of the resource 
units64.  The resource system should be commonly owned in a community, a good 
example being forest reserve – which is the resource the management of which we 
explore in our case study. As the CPRs have finite resource units, the scramble for 
consumption that is accompanied by non-willingness of appropriators to maintain the 
resources will eventually result in the depletion of the resources, hence the tragedy of the 
commons65.  The tragedy of the commons becomes imminent as the users derive direct 
benefits from consumption while only suffers delayed costs from the deterioration of the 
commons66. 
Using such parables as the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD), classical models of collective 
action predict that in CPRs, there is bound to be little cooperation among users to manage 
the resources in a sustainable way. In the allegory of the PD, it is assumed that two 
                                                 
63 Garret Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons” Science Vol. 162, 1968, pp. 1234-48 
64 Elinor Ostrom, (2000), Op. Cit. 
65 Garret Hardin (1968) Op. Cit. 
66 Elinor Ostrom (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
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prisoners are facing separate police interrogation. If prisoner A gives evidence against 
prisoner B and prisoner B remains silent, then B serves the maximum sentence and A is 
set free; the vice versa is true. This scenario represents non-cooperation between the 
prisoners. If both remain silent during the interrogation (i.e. if both cooperate), they both 
face a moderate sentence, while if they both confess, they face a higher sentence. In such 
a situation, the PD predicts that both would be selfish because they are not sure whether 
remaining silent (or not confessing) would be reciprocated by the other prisoner67.  
This parable signifies the inherent selfishness of people in CPR scenario that yield sub-
optimal choices. People are not willing to cooperate, say cut less trees in a common 
woodlot, because they are not sure whether others will do the same. Again in CPRs, 
people are not willing to invest in management of the commons because there is a high 
potential for other people to free-ride on the efforts of others. This uncertainty regarding 
the behaviour of other users also hinges on lack of enough information especially 
regarding the behaviour of the other users. Given this uncertainty, the individually 
rational (but collectively sub-optimal) choice is to consume as much as possible and 
invest as little as possible – hence the tragedy of the commons. 
Mancur Olson, in his book on the logic of collective action, also challenges the optimism 
expressed in group theory that individuals with common interests would voluntarily act 
so as to try to further those interests. The premise of Olson’s argument is that if a person 
cannot be excluded from obtaining the benefits of a collective good, once the good is 
produced, he has little incentive to contribute voluntarily to the provision, let alone 
maintenance of that good – the only incentive being to free-ride on the efforts of others68. 
The question of size of the group having access to the CPR was also central to Olson’s 
model. He indicated that “unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there 
is coercion or some other device to make individuals act in their common interest, 
rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group 
interests.”69 Thus, the larger the group size, the more non-cooperative the individuals 
                                                 
67 Also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner’s_dilemma  (Website visited June 2007) 
68 Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Groups and the Theory of Groups, 
Cambridge, MA, Havard University Press 
69 Mancur Olson as quoted in Elinor Ostrom (1990) Op. Cit. p. 6 (original emphasis) 
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will be. For intermediate groups, he indicated that cooperation will depend on how 
noticeable each person’s actions are. Thus, the more noticeable each person’s actions are, 
the more individuals will tend towards cooperation. This in a way starts to point towards 
social conformity and punishment as a silent force towards cooperation70. 
The imminent lack of cooperation among community members led to proposals that, as a 
solution to the tragedy of the commons, governments should sell the common properties 
to private owners to increase accountability and incentive to use and manage the 
resources prudently. Alternatively, governments could turn the CPRs into public property 
or introduce coercive laws to regulate usage through, for instance, auction system or any 
merit as determined from time to time71. The proposal to privatize the CPRs and/or 
introduce regulation, however, presupposes that regulators will act in the public interest 
and ecologically optimal way. In reality, this is not necessarily the case given information 
asymmetry. Again, if cases of, for instance, corruption is anything to go by, such 
proposed measures may not necessarily lead to optimal allocation and utilization of 
CPRs. 
Classical theories of collective action therefore show that, given individual or self-centred 
calculation among CPR users, there is little to no incentive for cooperation or self-
organization in the management of the commons at community level. 
2.1.2 Contemporary Theories of Collective Action: Potential for Collective 
Cooperation 
Informed mostly by case study approaches, contemporary theories of Collective Action 
highlight the potential for cooperation amongst community members in the management 
of CPRs. The studies show diverse conditions under which the propensity for community 
collective action in the management of CPRs is high. 
Robert Wade, in his study of collective action in villages in South India, showed that 
communities are likely to organize around sustainable management of (irrigation) water 
                                                 
70 This is expanded using contemporary theories of collective action as discussed in section 2.1.2 below 
71 See for instance Garret Hardin (1968) Op. Cit. 
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resources when lack of it will lead to loss of crops. Thus, community collective action 
regarding sustainable management of a CPR is likely when mismanagement of the CPR 
will have an adverse impact on people’s livelihood. In this case, the likelihood of 
appropriators cooperating is even higher when the supply of the CPR is unreliable. Wade 
made this proposition after observing that communities located downstream and who, 
accordingly, had less reliable water supply were more likely to cooperate than 
communities located upstream where water supply was more reliable72. 
Consistent with Wade’s propositions, Sarah Gillinson, in her multi-disciplinary study, 
also showed that if the survival of community members is dependent on the availability 
and efficient management of a particular CPR, then the chances of community members 
cooperating to sustain the CPR are high73. 
Other critical conditions for community cooperation and action in CPR management 
include the possibility and efficiency of communication among CPR appropriators, and 
their autonomy to make rules. Elinor Ostrom indicates that, if appropriators can engage in 
face-to-face bargaining and have autonomy to make and change their rules, a dimension 
missing in such parables as the PD, evidence shows that they may as well attempt to 
organize themselves to manage the CPR in a sustainable way74. Face-to-face bargaining 
ensures that appropriators have (enough) information about the conditions and likelihood 
of reciprocity by fellow users. This, in the context of community autonomy to devise its 
own management rules, gives some incentives to appropriators to cooperate in the 
management of CPRs. 
Evidence also shows that CPR users with long-term communal ownership claims, and 
who can communicate amongst themselves, develop their own agreements, establish 
positions of monitors, and sanctions those who do not conform to their own rules75. The 
collective ownership rights give incentives to the appropriators to effectively exclude 
                                                 
72 See Robert Wade (1994) Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India 
San Francisco, ICS Press 
73 Sara Gillinson “Why Cooperate? A Multi-Disciplinary Study of Collective Action”  Working Paper No. 
234, 2004, London, Overseas Development Institute 
74 Elinor Ostrom (2000) Op. Cit. 
75 Ibid. 
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non-members and manage the CPR in a sustainable way. The self-organization 
arrangements in CPR management have proved to be even more effective than 
government imposed strategies76. 
There is a considerable consensus among CPR scholars that CPRs and their appropriators 
should have specific attributes conducive to an increased likelihood for the emergence of 
self-governing community. The resource system should not be at a point of deterioration 
such that little advantage results from organizing. Thus, the benefits accrued to a well 
managed CPR should surpass the cost of managing it. The calculation of this net benefit 
is however possible if the resource system has predictable flow of resource units whose 
indicators are reliable and valid, and can be generated at relatively low cost77.  
To effectively exclude non-members and efficiently manage the CPR, CPRs should be 
sufficiently small for easy knowledge of external boundaries and internal transactions. 
This facilitates less complex (face-to-face) bargaining than in CPRs that cover very big 
domains78. 
On the other hand, the appropriators should have a common understanding of how the 
resource system operates and should depend on the resource system for a major portion 
of their livelihood. This is in line with Gillinson’s analysis that there are high chances of 
cooperation when appropriators depend on a specific resource for survival as indicated in 
this section above.  
Ostrom also indicates that there should be a good measure of trust and reciprocity 
amongst the users. CPR users, who have been in a community for reasonably long period 
of time, and whose communities are small enough for members to personally know each 
other, have a high probability of developing trust and reciprocity. This also agrees with 
Gillinson’s proposition that social capital is a critical condition for cooperation among 
                                                 
76 Ibid 
77 Ibid: 34; also see Sara Gillinson (2004), Op. Cit. 
78 Ibid 
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CPR users. Social capital in a community is however effective if there is previous 
organizational experience and local leadership79.  
To facilitate effective self-organization in CPR management, some scholars have further 
argued for elements that blend community factors and those that lie above and outside the 
community. 
Cristiana Seixas and Brian Davy identify key elements that contribute to self-
organization process in community-based conservation. The elements include 
involvement and commitment of key players (such as community members and local 
government officials), funding, strong leadership, capacity building, partnership with 
supportive organizations and government economic incentives such as alternative 
livelihood options80. There is however a fundamental difference in the factors 
contributing to community self-organization as advanced by such analysts as Elinor 
Ostrom and Sara Gillinson, on the one hand, and Cristiana Seixas and Brian Davy, on the 
other. Ostrom and Gillinson basically advance endogenous factors to community self-
organization, such as face-to-face bargaining and the CPR livelihood impact, while 
Seixas and Brian highlight more of exogenous than endogenous factors and sometimes a 
blend of the two. The implication is that, in the former, community self-organization 
emerges from the indigenous effort whereas in the latter the type of self-organization 
envisaged is tantamount to externally facilitated participatory social mobilization in 
community development. For the purposes of this paper, unless otherwise stated, self-
organization is conceived from Ostrom’s and Gillinson’s perspective. Seixas and Davy’s 
perspective will however be instructive when analyzing the interface between indigenous 
community self-organization and formal governance institutions.  
Other studies have however shown that the task of generating a list of generic conditions 
under which users of CPR self-organize is a difficult and futile attempt. Arun Agrawal, 
for instance, indicates that this task is a flawed and impossibly costly research task. For a 
way out, he examines the merits of context specific, statistical, comparative and case 
                                                 
79 Elinor Ostrom (2000) Op. Cit. pp. 34-35; Gillinson (2004), Op. Cit. 
80 Cristiana Seixas and Brian Davy, “Self-Organization in Integrated Conservation and Development 
Initiatives” International Journal of the Commons Vol. 2, No. 1, January 2008, p99 
 31  
 
study approaches to studying the commons81. This is intelligible considering the 
magnitude of diverse experiences of different local users in different contexts. This 
justifies the need for case studies, such as the one informing this paper, to understand the 
dynamics of community self-organization in a specific context.  The context-specific 
depth understanding in a case study will however also provide at least some analytical 
insights that can be applied in similar scenarios elsewhere. 
2.1.3 Community Self-organization: Spontaneity and Legitimacy 
Having analysed the ecologized theoretical context of community self-organization, this 
paper defines community self-organization as spontaneous emergence of order in a 
community in the management of people and resources aimed at sustaining the livelihood 
of the community members82. Francis Heylighen indicates that a complex system (where 
complexity is broadly defined as a continuum between order and disorder), tends towards 
self-organization, coordination and synergy to enhance predictability and sustainability83. 
In our context, in line with Ostrom and Gillinson’s reasoning, the more a community’s 
livelihood relies on CPR with finite units for survival, the more it tends towards 
coordination and self-organization to maintain and enhance the livelihood. 
Louise Comfort however alerts us to the fact that the vital but elusive characteristic of 
self-organization is its spontaneity. In this paper, spontaneity can therefore be defined as 
the endogenous natural tendency by community members to respond to issues affecting 
their lives. Comfort indicates that, while influenced by the actions of other organizations 
or groups, spontaneity can neither be imposed nor suppressed by external regulation84. If 
community self-organization is effective or more effective than externally facilitated or 
imposed CPR management, and in the context of growing external influence to 
community self-organization, this raises a challenge of striking a meaningful balance 
                                                 
81 Arun Agrawal “Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources” World 
Development Volume 29, No. 10, 2001, pp1649 - 1672 
82 This definition is adapted from Stuart Kauffman’s generic definition of self-organization. See for 
instance Stuart Kauffman as cited in Louise Comfort, “Self-Organization in Complex Systems” Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 4 No. 3, 1994, pp. 393 - 410 
83 Francis Heylighen, “Complexity and Self-organization” in Marcia Bates and Niles Maack (Eds) 
Encyclopedia of Library and Information Sciences, Brussels, Taylor & Francis, 2008 
84 Louise Comfort (1994) Op. Cit. p. 19 
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between the role of exogenous institutions such as government local governance 
institutions and endogenous institutions such as indigenous leadership in CPR 
management. This is the crux of this research paper. 
The question that arises therefore is: how do we ensure community spontaneity in 
managing resources that have an impact on their livelihoods? This brings us to the 
concept of legitimacy. It is argued that community members spontaneously relate to a 
system and participate in its sustainability if the system is embedded in the culture and 
history of the community85. Thus, in CPR management, spontaneity, which is a sine qua 
non of self-organization, comes about if the CPR management system is compatible with 
and complementary to the history and culture of a specific community. This implies that, 
whether community self-organization is facilitated or influenced by outside change 
agents or it is endogenous, there is need for a measure of legitimacy or cultural 
embeddedness to achieve spontaneous community self-organization. 
2.1.4 Community Self Organization: Governance Institutions 
This paper, in discussing CPR management, concentrates on the interface between formal 
local governance institutions and community indigenous (self-organization) governance 
institutions86. ‘Institutions’ is understood here to mean a set of rules and structures that 
guide behaviour in any system87. Thus, in governing the commons at community level, 
this paper will analyse the role of community level indigenous rules and structures such 
as traditional leaders (chiefs), traditional village fora and traditional rules pertaining to 
management of CPRs, and assess their interface with formal local governance institutions 
such as by-laws, district assemblies and community development committees. 
                                                 
85 See for instance Michael Schatzberg “Power, Legitimacy and ‘Democratization’ in Africa” Journal of 
the International African Institute Vol. 63, No. 4, 1993 pp 445-461; Michael Schatzberg (2001) Political 
Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food Bloomington: Indiana University Press; Pierre 
Englebert “Solving the Mystery of the AFRICA Dummy” World Development Vol. 28, No. 10, 2000 pp. 
1821 - 1835 
86 The formal local governance system is discussed at length in chapter 3 
87 See for instance Douglass North, “Institutions” Journal of Economic Perspective Vol. 5, No. 1, 1991, pp 
97-112 
 33  
 
2.1.5 Community Self-organization in the context of Formal Institutional 
Matrix 
As can be appreciated from the above discussion, community organization does not 
happen in a vacuum. Almost all countries have national policies, laws and structures that 
govern such CPRs as forests, whether they are managed by community appropriators or 
not88.  
As can be deduced from Ostrom’s conditions for effective self-organization in CPR 
management as presented in section 2.1.2, a legal framework that recognizes CPR 
appropriators’ independence to make their own rules regarding the management of the 
CPR is fundamental to self-organization. Ostrom further indicates that supportive legal 
structures at the macro-level that authorizes users to take responsibility for self-
organizing and crafting at least some of their own rules are necessary for the sprouting 
and sustainability of self-organization in CPR management89. This implies that, for 
effective community organization, the legal framework should not passively leave self-
organizations to their own devices but should proactively facilitate and support their 
development.  
It is further argued that national level institutions and community self-organization in 
CPR management work effectively if they are mediated by effective meso-level 
governance institutions in a decentralized set-up90. This therefore calls for some sort of 
CPR co-management between the meso-level governance and community self-
organization institutions, with the former facilitating and the latter micro-managing. The 
nature and form of this co-management framework and practice that would result in 
optimal outcomes to the benefit of communities, however, remains elusive. This study 
                                                 
88 This is true especially when we consider public policy broadly to mean government action or inaction on 
a phenomena of public interest (see Dye, T (1992) Understanding Public Policy Analysis  Prentice Hall) 
89 Elinor Ostrom (2000) Op. Cit. 
90 See for example N. Paudel et al  “Contextualizing Common Property Systems: Action Research Insights 
on Forging Effective Links Between Forest Commons and ‘Meso’ Layer Governance” 
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001992/00/Paudel_NS.pdf , 2006, (Website Visited on 23rd May 
2007). This argument is fleshed out in chapter 3. 
 34  
 
therefore attempts to explore and fill this lacuna using a case on forest resource 
management in Sinyala. 
2.2 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the concept of community self-organization in the context of 
the theories of collective action. The chapter has shown that, much as there are problems 
of collective action in the management of CPRs, there is a huge potential for cooperation 
among CPR appropriators especially when the livelihood of the appropriators depend on 
the CPR, when there is relative independence for appropriators to make their own rules, 
and when the CPR governance institutions are culturally embedded in the community.  
The next chapter discusses formal local governance system and how it interacts with the 
indigenous community self-organization governance in a decentralized set-up. This 
discussion is couched in the community development discourse. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DECENTRALIZATION AND COMMUNITY SELF-
ORGANIZATION 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
Community institutions are often bound and affected by State institutions. As such, their 
activities and organization must conform to the institutional direction of the State. 
Paradoxically, the State policy direction that disregards community institutions is bound 
to be inappropriate and irrelevant to the needs of the communities. The synergy between 
institutions outside communities and the endogenous community institutions is therefore 
crucial to understanding community development in general and CPR management in 
particular.  
This chapter locates community self-organization within the formal governance system. 
Specifically, the chapter reviews community self-organization within the decentralized 
institutional matrix. Having looked at the potential for community self-organization in 
chapter 2, this chapter analyses the potential for managing community resources within 
existing formal institutions that lie outside the community but are designed to govern the 
communities. Our emphasis is on meso-level governance institutions that conceptually 
are located in the space between the national level and community level governance 
institutions, especially in as far as the meso-level governance institutions interact with the 
community institutions. 
This chapter also completes the conceptual framework of this paper that paints the scope 
of the study and sets the analytical framework. 
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3.1 MESO-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND COMMUNITY SELF-
ORGANIZATION IN A DECENTRALIZED SET-UP 
This section starts by bridging chapters 2 and 3, that is, showing the link between 
community organization in CPR management and formal institutions in decentralized 
framework. The concept of meso-level governance institutions is key to this connection. 
3.1.1 Meso-level governance 
Meso-level governance is here conceptualized as that layer between local level and 
national (policy) level91. This layer occurs immediately ‘outside’ and ‘above’ the local 
level. This level of governance is said to constantly interact with users of CPRs and in the 
process shape the political, social and environmental outcomes of CPR management. 
The meso-level consists of actors, institutions and processes that interact with each other 
and with users of the commons. They interpret and enforce policies and regulations, and 
can also reinterpret or misinterpret policies according to their own interests and agendas, 
with beneficial or deleterious effects on the actors and the commons92. As ‘middle’ 
agents, they mediate and channel policy feedback to the national level, and policy 
resources from the national level to the local level. The actors at meso-level include local 
government officials, government department officials such as forest officers, NGOs, and 
private organizations whose activities have a bearing on specific CPRs. The institutions 
include local government laws (by-laws), local regulations and local government 
structures outside and above community based organizations. The processes include the 
networks and fora facilitated by the actors and institutions. This study concentrates on the 
meso-level government institutions in a decentralized framework as they interact with 
community-based organisation in CPR management. 
                                                 
91 N. Paudel et al  “Contextualizing Common Property Systems: Action Research Insights on Forging 
Effective Links Between Forest Commons and ‘Meso’ Layer Governance” 
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001992/00/Paudel_NS.pdf , 2006 
92 Ibid 
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As indicated in chapter 2, the literature on CPRs is heavily focused on understanding how 
users of the commons interact with each other regarding production, maintenance and 
appropriation of these resources, with little emphasis, if any, on meso-level governance. 
N. Paudel et al actually indicate that the concept of meso-level governance is missing 
from the current literature on CPR93. 
Analysis however shows that the concept of meso-layer governance is not totally missing 
from the current literature on CPRs. For instance, Francis Cleaver argues that public 
actions and interests cannot necessarily be separated from the private actions; formal 
manifestations of management from informal; and modern authority and institutional 
structures from traditional ones94. Cleaver further shows that the embeddedness of 
institutions in social relations does not imply solidity or fixedness in some mythical 
‘social reality’. Drawing from Giddens’ Agency and Structure, and Douglous North’s 
Institutions in shaping individual perceptions and action, Cleaver concludes that 
embeddedness of institutions in social relations involves evolving and negotiated 
relationships between socially, historically, and ecologically located people who shape 
and are shaped by a variety of institutions of varying degrees of formality and 
organization95. 
Ostrom also advances an evolutionist notion when she indicated that better institutions 
can be ‘crafted’ by CPR users and policy makers where culture and social structure, 
increasingly referred to as ‘social capital’, become raw materials to be built upon and 
improved96. 
The foregoing therefore shows that institutions, whether at micro-, meso- or macro-level, 
formal or informal, are an integral part of human relations. Contrary to Paudel et al 
therefore, what is missing in the current literature on CPRs is not necessarily the meso-
level governance concept but rather its wider and deeper empirical analysis to elucidate 
the dynamics and outcomes of the interaction between the community endogenous 
                                                 
93 Ibid. 
94 Francis Cleaver “Moral Ecological Rationality: Institutions and the Management of Common Property 
Resources” in Development and Change Vol. 31, No. 2, 2000, pp. 361 - 83 
95 Ibid: 362, my emphasis 
96 Ostrom as cited by Francis Cleaver (2000) Op. Cit.: 365 
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organization and the meso-level institutions. Francis Cleaver’s analysis of institutions of 
varying degrees of formality in CPR management, for instance, sets the momentum for 
consideration of institutional interface in CPR management, but falls short of primary 
empirical substantiation. This paper therefore sets out to explore and fill this gap using a 
case study from Sinyala in Malawi. 
Meso-level governance, especially in a decentralized framework, shows, as alluded to in 
chapter 2, that the formal institutional framework does not passively leave community 
self-organizations to their own devices but consciously and/or sub-consciously facilitate, 
support and shape their development and outcomes.  
One subtle dichotomy that needs elaboration at this stage is the difference between self-
organization and participatory management in CPR management. On the one extreme, as 
can be deduced from chapter 2, self-organization in CPR management is the highest 
degree of participatory management that entails CPR appropriators mobilizing 
themselves to use and maintain the commons in a sustainable way to improve their own 
livelihoods. Moving along the continuum, as meso-level institutions, processes and actors 
interact with CBOs and facilitate CPR management, the concept shifts from self-
organization (in the aboriginal sense) to participatory management.  Thus participatory 
management is a relative concept that shows the degree of CPR users’ participation in 
managing the commons in the context of the meso-level (and national level) governance.  
Much as community self-organization seems optimal, it presupposes autonomy from 
external authority in formulating and applying rules. However, in a legal set-up, all rules 
are subject to by-laws at local government level, and national laws at national level – in 
that order. For instance, the Malawi Constitution clearly stipulates that, 
“[a]ny Act of Government or any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of 
this Constitution shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be invalid”97
                                                 
97 Government of Malawi (1999) The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi 
Section 5. 
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This then implies that self-organization should be understood within the bounds of both 
local and national laws and policies. Thus, community self-organization that emerges 
with little to no influence from meso-level institutions should at the end of the day be 
within the laws the interpretation and application of which largely lies with the meso-
level institutions. On the other hand, community organisations that emerge through the 
facilitation of meso-level institutions should also be consistent with the laws. Thus, the 
(local) government framework breeds a de facto and de jure co-management of CPRs 
between the meso- and the micro-level. 
3.1.2 Meso-level Governance in a Decentralized Government System 
Ironically, it has been claimed that studies on the commons that exposed huge potential 
for effective community self-organization have led to the drive for decentralization of 
CPR management by governments. For instance, the 1999 Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) study on forestry policies indicated that, following evidence on 
community self-organization in CPRs, by 2001, over 50 countries claimed to be pursuing 
initiatives that would devolve some control over resources to local users98. Although it 
may be difficult to sustain this claim, research on the commons has surely informed how 
policy makers think about CPR management. 
Decentralization refers to any act in which the central government formally cedes power, 
authority and resources to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political, 
administrative and territorial hierarchy99. Decentralization can be political or 
administrative. Administrative decentralization (sometimes called deconcentration) 
involves transfer of power to local branches of central government that are primarily 
responsible to the central government for carrying out centrally defined functions such as 
tax collection. On the other hand, political decentralization entails devolution of central 
government powers to political actors and institutions representative of local 
                                                 
98 A. Agrawal ‘Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources’ in World 
Development Volume 29, No. 10, 2001, p. 1650 
99 Manwood as cited in Asiyati Chiweza ‘Participation: Reality or Rhetoric in Rural Communities of 
Malawi?’ Tanzanet Journal Volume 5, No. 1, 2005, pp. 1-8 
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populations100. Our emphasis is on political decentralization because since the 1990s 
most African countries have undergone democratic processes, one of whose indicators is 
the devolution of central government powers to local levels101. The decentralized local 
government institution has been considered as one of the most appropriate domain of 
autonomy in which communities can exercise their right to elect their representatives and 
hold them to account, and participate in decision making processes that affect their 
livelihood. In this set-up, since the government is closer to the people, public service 
delivery and feedback mechanism with the communities is efficient and effective as 
demand and supply for local public goods are easily matched102. 
The local government institutions therefore form a meso-layer that mediates the central 
government institutions and processes on the one hand, and the community institutions 
and processes on the other. This meso-layer also creates the necessary autonomous 
environment for community self-organization in CPR management subject only to the 
Law. 
3.1.3 Local Governance and Community Development 
The interface between meso-level and micro-level governance institutions brings into 
question the discourse on local governance and community development. 
Damien Kingsbury draws our attention to the fact that, in as far as development is meant 
to be about improving the lives of people, it is logical that development should start with 
people103. Development should therefore guarantee community (direct) participation, and 
hence empowerment, that ensures people’s control over issues that affect their own lives. 
This is said to bring about community development104. In this context, Edwards and 
Jones see community development as a process that “is especially directed by local 
                                                 
100 Asiyati Chiweza (2005) Op. Cit. 
101 Asiyati Chiweza “Local Government” in N. Patel and L. Svasand (Eds) Government and Politics in 
Malawi Zomba, Kachere Books, 2007, pp. 142-143 
102 Ibid 
103 Damien Kingsbury “Community Development” in Damien Kingsbury et al (Eds) Key Issues in 
Development New York, Pelgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 221 
104 Ibid 
 41  
 
people towards objectives which they regard as beneficial to the community”105. Implicit 
in this understanding of participatory community development is the indispensable role 
of collective action to achieve community development. Thus, community (collective) 
self-organization gives practical expression to the idea of participation and hence 
community empowerment and development. This is particularly true if we consider that 
individuals, especially in rural areas where the majority of people in developing countries 
live, control few economic resources and have little political influence. They must 
therefore rely on group action to pool resources and exert pressure on development 
agents to achieve meaningful community development106. 
Scholars agree that the best institutional framework that can support efficient and 
effective community development is the decentralized political and administrative 
structure107. In a decentralized institutional matrix, efficient and effective community 
development is achieved through two major ways: firstly, as the central government 
devolve resources and authority to local government, the local institutions facilitate the 
collection of better and more reliable information about local conditions and this enables 
quick, appropriate and relevant government response to local needs108. Secondly, and 
probably more important, decentralization enables communities to actively and directly 
participate and make decisions on issues affecting their lives and this ensures the 
relevance and appropriateness of solutions, and self- and collective efficacy109. 
If community (collective) participation in issues affecting the community members’ lives 
is the heart of community development, community self-organization discussed in 
chapter 2 can therefore be said to be the highest form of community development 
process. By extension, development institutional arrangement that creates an environment 
conducive for community self-organization can be said to be the desirable institutional 
set-up for community development. The case study in this paper therefore assesses the 
                                                 
105 Edwards and Jones as quoted in Tsitso Monaheng “Community Development and Community 
Organization – the Role of the Change Agent” Francois Theron (Ed) The Development Change Agent – A 
Micro-level Approach to Development Pretoria, Van Schaik, 2008, pp. 125-126 
106 See for instance Tsitso Monaheng (2008) Op. Cit. p.128 
107 See for instance Francois Theron (Ed) (2008) Op. Cit.; Asiyati Chiweza (2007) Op. Cit.; Damien 
Kingsbury et al (Ed) (2004) Op. Cit. 
108 See for instance Tsitso Monaheng (2008) Op. Cit. p.133 
109 See for instance Asiyati Chiweza (2005) Op. Cit. 
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extent to which local governance institutional arrangement achieves this optimal 
institutional set-up for optimal community development. 
3.1.4 Forest Resources and Community Development 
The issue under study within which community organization and local governance will 
be explored is community forest resource management. Community forest resources 
provide an ideal CPR where theories of collective action and community development 
can be meaningfully tested.  This is the case because in most rural areas, for instance in 
Malawi where the study is located, most families rely on wood fuel for their household 
energy use. Apart from energy, forest resources also provide building materials, 
medicine, game meat, wild fruits and vegetables to rural communities. Thus forest 
resources are part of rural communities’ livelihood. In rural communities where people 
rely on forest resources as in the case under study, community development efforts would 
be incomplete if they ignored forest resource management. In this context, most studies 
on CPRs and collective action have also used forest resource management to unpack the 
dynamics of community collective action and community development110.  
As per FAO, community forestry is defined as any situation which intimately involves 
local people in a forestry activity. This locates community forestry within the larger 
participatory development paradigm. In such cases, issues of development sustainability, 
land use, community participation, capacity building empowerment, democratization and 
good governance are elaborated in the community forestry discourse and empirics.  
In analyzing people-centred approaches towards community forestry, Cori Ham et al 
bring out salient issues namely: participation of community stakeholders; the legal and 
institutional framework for community forestry; local indigenous knowledge and social 
learning; and collaborative management111. Consistent with the literature analysed above, 
they indicate that forestry and other related problems can never be addressed without the 
                                                 
110 See for instance Cori Ham et al “The Forester as a Change Agent – From Trees between the People to 
People between the Trees” in Francois Theron (ed) (2008) Op. Cit. pp. 173-201; A. Agrawal (2001) Op. 
Cit. 
111 Ibid  
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direct participation of rural people – the intended beneficiaries of the development 
activities. They also show that institutional and legal framework, such as Forestry Act, is 
indispensable in understanding and analysing community forestry and development112. 
This paper will specifically analyse the institutional framework as spelled out by 
decentralization and other relevant policies in as far as they interact with community 
(informal) institutions in community forest management and community development. 
Cori Ham et al also show that understanding local indigenous knowledge is crucial in 
assessing planning partnership in local development. They indicate that development 
change agents should incorporate indigenous knowledge in all their development plans to 
make the plans relevant and effective. In this context, addressing development agents, 
Cori Ham et al emphasize collaborative forest management where the development 
agents and government continue to exercise broad regulatory role especially where there 
are significant environmental externalities, while the communities also assume 
management role on aspects such as maintenance especially where their livelihood is 
directly affected113.  
3.2 CONCEPTUALIZING DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL 
GOVERNANCE STRATA 
Informed by chapter 2 and the discussion above in this chapter, this section aims at 
conceptualizing the layers of development governance institutions. The conceptual clarity 
is necessary to locate some concepts and issues identified in the literature pertaining to 
the interface between meso- and micro-level governance institutions. The following 
conceptual framework also defines the scope of our case study. 
The institutional overlaps in development processes can be conceptualized as in the 
figure 1 below: 
 
                                                 
112 Ibid 
113 Ibid, pp. 187-188 
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Figure 1. Development Institutional Interface 
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Interface ‘a’ represents development process interact between communities and meso-
level institutions such as NGOs and local government structures. In this interface, meso-
level institutions relay and interpret national laws, policies and resources to communities. 
This often happens in the context of the intermediary institutions’ development 
philosophy. Communities also present their needs to the meso-level institutions or to 
national level through the meso-level institutions.  
Interface ‘b’ represents the interaction between meso-level development institutions and 
national level institutions. This happens, for instance, when local government officials 
and NGOs represent their and communities’ demands to national level institutions, and 
when national level institutions relay policies and resources to communities through local 
government structures and NGOs.  
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Interface ‘c’ represent instances when national level institutions interact directly with 
communities, like when local community members give policy input directly to members 
of parliament or executive members. 
Interface ‘d’ represents instances when communities, meso-level institutions and national 
level institutions interact. A typical instance is when members of the executive arm of 
government simultaneously consult local community members and NGOs on some 
proposed national policy.  
As can be noted from interfaces ‘a’ to ‘d’, the development process can be complex and 
costly. The decentralization process however attempts to make this development process 
less complex and less costly. Figure 2 below illustrates this attempt: 
Figure 2. Development interface in a decentralized institutional framework 
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As can be appreciated from figure 2 above, decentralization has the potential to minimize 
transaction costs in development processes. Much as in reality there are still some 
overlaps between national institutions, intermediary institutions and micro-level 
institutions, most of these overlaps are minimized with the institutionalization of local 
governance system. In simplistic terms, we remain with two main overlaps, ‘a’ (micro- 
and meso-level institutions) and ‘b’ (meso- and macro-level institutions). Our study will 
centre on interface ‘a’ with emphasis on the development interaction between local 
government structures and officials and community organization structures in forest 
resource management. 
3.2.1 The Problematics of Micro- and Meso-level Governance Institutional 
Interface 
Having conceptualized our analytical framework and research scope, this section 
attempts to highlight some issues that need special attention if we are to understand and 
prescribe the interaction between micro- and meso-level institutions in community 
development. 
Bottom-up vs Top-down Development 
There is scholarly consensus in community development that initiatives that emanate 
from macro- or meso-level institutions and processes and disregard micro-level ideas and 
involvement are bound to be irrelevant and inappropriate to local needs, and 
unsustainable in the long-run. It is therefore widely recognized that development 
initiatives ought to be bottom-up, i.e. development should be demand-driven and the 
beneficiaries of any development initiative must be involved right from the planning 
stage, implementation to evaluation stage. This will not only ensure cultural and societal 
relevance and appropriateness of the development initiatives, but will also respect the 
beneficiaries’ right to participation – in line with the human rights approach to 
development114. 
                                                 
114 See for instance Damien Kingsbury (2004) Op. Cit.; Francois Theron (Ed) (2008) Op. Cit. 
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However, not all decisions taken at local level are appropriate. Some decisions emanate 
from people’s desperation and often have a short-term horizon. Other decisions, due to 
information asymmetry and/or illiteracy, are based on limited understanding of 
opportunities or consequences of specific choices; while others are limited by 
idiosyncratic interests of local leaders that often might also be based on limited 
understanding of options or outcomes115. In this context, much as community 
development beneficiaries need to be involved in their development processes as a matter 
of priority, some top-down development strategies are not totally defunct. The top-down 
development initiatives can range from donor or government community development 
funding, technical assistance, to social mobilization for community development. 
Analysing democratic participation in Norway, Jacob Aars notes paradoxical top-down 
strategies for bottom-up involvement where political elites spearheaded efforts to 
mobilize local residents for political participation116. 
To analyze community development holistically therefore, there is a need to strike a 
meaningful balance between community (development beneficiary) involvement and 
external (development agent) involvement. 
External Involvement: The Development Change Agent Phenomenon 
There is hardly any community that has not been influenced by a development 
intervention from outside – to different levels of success. As Francois Theron puts it,  
“The fact that development should be endogamous – from within communities, 
and that it should be a spontaneous process, remains the ideal approach, but the 
outcome of development programmes/projects often shows that this seldom 
happens. The type of ‘development’ that the world has known, and which it will 
still imitate for many years, is the type introduced from the top, the outside, in a 
mechanistic manner by development institutions, governments and so forth, 
through a host of people whom we refer to as ‘change agents’ correlatively, 
                                                 
115 Damien Kingsbury (2004) Op. Cit: p223 
116 Jacob Aars “Democratic Renewal in Local Government? Top Down Strategies for Bottom Up 
Involvement” Paper Presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions 2003 Edinburgh, March 28th – April 2nd 2003, 
pp 1-24. http://www.paltin.ro/biblioteca/Aars.pdf  (Website visited 28 May 2008) 
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accepting the problematic nature of this concept… This is a reality we need to 
accept although this approach has direct correlation to why development often 
fails.”117
This inherent top-down externally initiated development, and the need for contextually 
relevant and appropriate local development that entails direct involvement of the 
development beneficiaries, makes community development a complex topic. On the one 
extreme, a purely externally driven development is bound to be irrelevant and 
inappropriate to local needs; will lack legitimacy; and may promote dependency among 
the beneficiaries. On the other extreme, a purely independent endogenous community 
development is not feasible as communities exist within authoritative legal and 
institutional frameworks, and are required to align their existence in this matrix. To this 
extent, closing the gap between change agents (outside knowledge) and the beneficiaries 
of development (inside knowledge) should be explored118. There is therefore need for 
careful hybridization that will require some form of partnership and synergy among 
micro-, meso- and macro-level development agents and institutions. This paper therefore 
explores the possible best interface between micro- and meso-levels of development 
governance. 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has located community self-organization and development in the broader 
decentralized institutional framework. The study of community development is 
incomplete if decentralization is not taken into consideration. The chapter has shown that 
development, and community development in particular, is a complex process of 
interaction between macro-, meso- and micro-level institutions. This paper concentrates 
on the meso- and micro-levels interface. The next chapter therefore explores the 
dynamics of this overlap using a Malawian case of community forest resource 
management. 
                                                 
117 Francois Theron (2008) Op. Cit. p.2  
118 Ibid 
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS: COMMUNITY BASED FOREST 
MANAGEMENT IN SINYALA 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an analysis of data collected from Sinyala on community based 
forest management. In a typical case study approach, theoretical constructs and concepts 
developed in chapters 1 to 3 were used as analytical lens for the Sinyala case. At the same 
time, the analysis was open to findings that might challenge or buttress the theoretical 
constructs. Thus, the analysis took an eclectic approach119. 
The chapter shows the crucial role that decentralized meso-level institutions and actors 
play in community forest resource management in Sinyala and the enduring influence of 
indigenous micro-level institutions. The interface of the meso- and micro-level 
institutions plays out in such a way as to highlight the problematics and potentials for an 
optimal hybridization of the institutions. 
The data informing this chapter were gathered from interviews with government officials 
involved in local government, community development, and forestry; traditional leaders; 
and community members from Lilongwe district. The interviews were spread across the 
meso- and micro-layers of governance in community development as outlined in table 1 
in chapter 1. Government policy documents and relevant literature were also consulted. 
The chapter starts with a presentation of the evolution of forest resource management and 
governance in Malawi. The chapter later narrows down to the case of Sinyala.  
 
                                                 
119 See J. Chima (2005) Op. Cit. 
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4.1 EVOLUTION OF FOREST RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN 
MALAWI 
Prior to British colonialism in Malawi, communities managed their own forest resources 
using indigenous knowledge embedded in practice, customs and culture passed on 
through generations120.  
In 1898, eight years after Malawi became a British protectorate, the Department of 
Forestry was formed. The primary aim was said to be environmental protection. This 
development saw the declaration of 48 forest reserves covering 673,400 hectares in the 
following four decades. The forest reserves largely covered catchment areas and river 
sources121. 
In 1926, the colonial government instituted the Village Forest Area (VFA) scheme with 
the aim of providing each village with an area of forest woodland for poles and firewood. 
The VFA rules enacted in 1931 under the Forest Ordinance gave traditional village 
headmen wide powers to control the VFAs even though the ultimate ownership right and 
responsibility rested with the colonial government122. 
When Malawi attained her political independence in 1964, management responsibility of 
indigenous woodlands on customary lands (that included forests beyond village areas) 
was transferred from central government to district councils. The management included 
revenue generation through selling of forest resources notably wood. The revenue 
realized from the selling of wood from 1964 to 1985 was significant in supplementing 
central government subvention of local government budgets in district councils. 
However, due to poor management that included embezzlement and overexploitation of 
                                                 
120 Kalipeni, E. and Zulu, L. ‘From Top-Down to Bottom-Up: The Difficult Case of the Bantyre City 
Fuelwood Project’ Journal of Southern African Studies Vol. 28, No. 1, Special Issue: Malawi, March 2002 
pp. 120-1 
121 Ibid 
122 Ibid 
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woodlands by the district councils, management responsibility reverted back to central 
government in 1985123. 
From 1985 to 1993, a revenue sharing mechanism was put in place where 80% of the 
proceeds were allocated to district councils and 20% to central government. From 1993, a 
Forestry Policy revision provided for the allocation of 25% of revenue generated from 
customary woodlands directly to District Development Committees (DDC) within the 
district councils124. 
At village level, forest resource management was however still coordinated by the village 
headmen. Communal cooperation in forest resource management at village level has been 
enhanced largely by the enduring authority of the traditional village headmen. However, 
the government still remained the ultimate ownership right holder of all customary land 
including the forests. The government would therefore intervene in the management of 
the forests especially if it deemed that forests were being overexploited. This created 
some ownership right ambivalence in customary (and community) forest resource 
management. The community self-organisation in forest resource management has 
therefore not been purely autonomous as the government remained the ultimate custodian 
of the communal forest rights125. 
This ownership right ambivalence has been said to have led to increased deforestation, 
threatening the very livelihoods of community members in Malawian villages most of 
whom rely on forest resources for energy, income and farming. For instance, Malawi 
government reported that open access to indigenous forest resources encouraged rapid 
depletion, and while this might have generated a short-term income for some families, it 
led to resource scarcity, catchment degradation, and deepening of rural poverty126. 
Another explanatory variable could be cooperation complications emanating from co-
management dynamics. There is bound to be conflicts among neighbouring villages in 
forest resource management in cases where a forest overlaps more than one village. In 
                                                 
123 Ibid 
124 Ibid 
125 Government of Malawi (2003) Community Based Forest Management: A Supplement to the National 
Forest Policy of Malawi, 1996 Zomba: Malawi Government Printers 
126 Ibid 
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such instances, preservation of forest reserves is dependent on the cooperation of, not 
only one village community, but several village headmen and their subjects, a 
phenomenon that compounds collective action as issues of jurisdiction and boundaries 
complicates negotiation and cooperation dynamics. The Sinyala case in this paper 
explores this dimension as Sinyala forest area is used by two neighbouring villages. 
Due to the increase in deforestation, cases of mismanagement, and difficulties to police 
government forest management rules to adequately protect indigenous forest and 
encourage afforestation127, Malawi government formulated a National Forestry Policy in 
1996. This policy, together with policies and laws like the Decentralization Policy of 
1996, Environment Act of 1996, and the Local Government Act of 1998, formalized the 
devolution of natural resource management, including forest resource management, to the 
local level. District Assemblies, within the decentralized institutional framework, were to 
coordinate all local development including natural resource management. This 
institutional development marked a significant shift towards participatory forest 
management approach that would involve communities, and other meso-level 
stakeholders like government departments and officials, NGOs and the private sector128.  
Analysis of the institutional arrangement from government of Malawi policy documents 
and interviews with government officials and traditional leaders shows that the ideal 
decentralized local government institutional framework within which community based 
natural resource management should operate is as follows129: 
 
 
 
                                                 
127 See Government of Malawi (2003) Op. Cit. 
128 Government of Malawi (1996) Op. Cit. 
129 See for instance Government of Malawi, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (2004) 
Village Action Planning Handbook, Lilongwe; Government of Malawi (2003) Op. Cit. 
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Figure 3: Natural Resource Management in Malawi: Local Government 
Institutional Framework 
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This formal devolution of natural resource management resulted in the formation of 
resource management committees that were connected in a hierarchy from village level to 
the District Assembly level. In figure 3 above, the gray rectangular blocks represent main 
bodies in local governance in Malawi. The oval shapes represent sub-committees. The 
solid lines represent direct interaction between the connected bodies/committees while 
the dotted lines represent occasional, indirect or task-specific interaction between 
connected (sub) committees.  
As can be seen in figure 3, at the macro-level, the parent ministry of all local government 
development initiatives is the Ministry of Local Government. The ministry is responsible 
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for broad policy direction for local development and for channelling resources from 
central government to local government structures through the District Assembly.  
Malawi has 28 districts and each has a District Assembly that coordinates and oversees 
all development activities in a district. The District Assembly is the hub of resource 
generation for development projects at district level, and making by-laws and policies for 
local development in a district. It is basically composed of elected ward councillors, 
elected members of parliament, traditional leaders who are non-voting ex-officio 
members, and five other representatives from civil society appointed by elected members 
of the Assembly130. In natural resource management such as forestry, the District 
Assembly has District Environment sub-committee that coordinates all natural resource 
management activities in a district. This sub-committee gets technical support from the 
District Executive Committee (DEC), another District Assembly sub-committee, that is 
composed of heads of government departments at district level such as the District Forest 
Officer (DFO). 
Below the District Assembly is the Area Development Committee that oversees 
development activities in several villages that fall under a Traditional Authority (chief) – 
TA131. The TA seats as an ex-officio member of the ADC. In natural resource 
management, the ADC has a coordinating sub-committee called Area Natural Resource 
Management Committee (ANRMC). As at District level, this sub-committee gets 
technical support from another ADC sub-committee called the Area Executive 
Committee (AEC) composed of government front-line officials from different 
departments such as the Forest Technical Assistant from the Department of Forest. 
At the micro-level, the District Assembly, through the ADC and the AEC, facilitates the 
election of a Village Natural Resources Management Committee (VNRMC) to manage  a 
specific village forest area. In this committee, the village headman is a non-voting ex-
officio member. The VNRMC is a sub-committee of the Village Development Committee 
                                                 
130 See Asiyati Chiweza in N. Patel and L. Svasand (2007) Op. Cit. 
131 A Traditional Authority is an administrative unit under a traditional chief also called Traditional 
Authority (TA) whose jurisdiction covers several Group Village Headmen. A Group Village Headman is a 
traditional chief heading a group of villages – each village being headed by a Village headman. 
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(VDC) that coordinates and oversees development activities in several villages that fall 
under a Group Village Headman. At this level, the VDC and the VNRMC directly gets 
policy direction from the ADC but also get technical support from the AEC and some 
policy direction and harmonization from ANRMC. 
There are public, private, and traditional customary land tenure systems in Malawi 
forestry land132. In our study, we will concentrate on customary land tenure system 
because that is where community forest reserves, normally managed by villages, are 
located. A village in Malawi is the smallest traditional administrative unit headed by a 
village head, whose members are homogeneous in that they are linked by tribe. The size 
of a village is often small enough for members to know each other personally hence a 
potential for cooperation133. The institution of the village head is traditionally instituted 
through royal lineage and is legally recognized by the Malawi (Traditional) Chiefs Act. 
The communal management, the exclusivity and rivalrous nature of forest resources 
benefits make the customary forests in Malawi villages a typical common property 
resource (CPR) thereby posing such cooperation challenges as free-riding134.  
4.2 SINYALA PROFILE 
Sinyala is an area made up of two villages: Sinyala Group and Sinyala Joshua135. Sinyala 
is a community of the Chewa ethnic group. The ethnic group in Sinyala emigrated from 
Mozambique in search for fertile soils and water and settled at Sinyala in 1922136. 
Sinyala has a community forest area of about 35 hectares which is now preserved under 
the community based forest management programme within the decentralized forest 
policy of Malawi government137. Prior to the Forest policy of 1996, all forests, including 
                                                 
132 Sikwese, (2006) Participatory Forestry under Decentralization Policies: The Case of Lilongwe Forestry 
Project, Malawi Forestry and Horticulture Department, Bunda College of Agriculture, Malawi 
133 See Olson, M in E. Ostrom (1990) Op. Cit. 
134 See chapter 2 
135 The names “Group” and “Joshua” are added to Sinyala to differentiate the part of Sinyala headed by a 
Group Village Headman, and the other headed by a Village Headman whose clan name in Joshua. 
136 B. Y. Mtsisi Participatory Forest Management Plan for Sinyala Village Forest Area Sinyala VNRMC, 
Malingunde, Lilongwe, June 2007 
137 In this paper, when referring to Sinyala, any use of the generic name ‘village forest area (VFA)’ will be 
referring to the Sinyala forest area that overlaps two villages (See map 4 on page xv) 
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Sinyala forest, were legally owned by the Malawi government. The community based 
forest management programme therefore aimed at transferring ownership of village 
forests to communities to improve sustainable management of the forests138. 
Sinyala falls under TA Masumbakhunda in Malingunde area. It lies about 35 kilometres 
South West of Lilongwe city, the capital of Malawi139. The Lilongwe river that supplies 
water to the Kamuzu dam, the main reservoir for piped water to Lilongwe city, borders 
Sinyala to the West, making Sinyala sustainable forest resource management a crucial 
issue to Lilongwe Water Board – the water authority for Lilongwe city140. 
According to the interviews with Sinyala traditional leaders, Sinyala has about 175 
households with an average of 5 people per household141. The average land holding size 
per household is 2 to 3 acres. The people of Sinyala are predominantly subsistence 
farmers who grow rain-fed maize as a staple food. They also grow vegetables, 
groundnuts, soya beans, cassava and sweet potatoes as cash crops. Some people sell 
firewood bought from Katete and Dzalanyama government forests as a source of income. 
Some households keep live stock such as goats and chickens for subsistence142. 
Sinyala’s main source of energy is wood fuel, making forestry a crucial aspect of their 
livelihood. At the time of fieldwork, community members reported getting their firewood 
from pruned branches of trees from the preserved Sinyala community forest, buying 
wood from Katete and Dzalanyama government forest reserves, and using trees naturally 
growing and grown in their household gardens. 
Sinyala community members took the initiative to tap water from the Dzalanyama forest 
reserve through pipes to the Sinyala villages. During the field interviews however, 
Sinyala traditional leaders indicated that the pipes had since been damaged by some 
                                                 
138 See Government of Malawi (2003) Community Based Forest Management: A Supplement to the 
National Forest Policy of Malawi, 1996 Zomba: Malawi Government Printers 
139 See Maps 2 and 3 on pages xiii and xiv 
140 See Map 4 on page xv 
141 The Sinyala Participatory Forest Management Plan (see B.Y. Mtsitsi (2007) Op. Cit.) shows that Sinyala 
has 109 households. This discrepancy might be due to the time lag between the time of the participatory 
management process (2002/3) and the fieldwork for this paper (2008). This paper will therefore consider 
Sinyala as having 175 households. 
142 See B. Y. Mtsisi (2007) Op. Cit. p. 6 
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people in some villages through which the pipes passed, and the piped water system was 
no longer working. At the time of the fieldwork therefore, Sinyala relied on three 
boreholes drilled by government which research participants indicated are not enough. 
Sinyala has Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), a farm 
produce market, where people can sell and buy farm produce; a police station; and a post 
office. There is a government primary school, a Mission hospital and a trading centre 
about 2 kilometres from Sinyala143. 
Before 1994, the two villages were one as community members belong to the same 
Chewa ethnic grouping and related clans. The traditional chieftaincy (Village Headman) 
heading Sinyala was then alternating between two related royal families. In 1994 
however, after succession squabbles, the two royal families and their relatives decided to 
split Sinyala into two villages, Sinyala Group and Sinyala Joshua. After the split, the 
bigger part of Sinyala forest area was geographically located in Sinyala Group village 
though Sinyala Joshua residents also used it. This development sparked ownership and 
management incentive issues that are unpacked in the sections below. 
4.3 DEVELOPMENT PERCEPTION AND VISION 
In as far as forest management impacts on people’s livelihood in a significant way as 
highlighted in section 1.1.3 in chapter 1, the fieldwork set out to explore development 
perception and goals of development agents and beneficiaries. The aim was to locate 
community forest management within the broader context of development discourse and 
initiatives.  
Analysis of field findings and documents reveals that development perception and goals 
varied as we move from the meso- to the micro-layers of development institutions, actors 
and beneficiaries. From the District Assembly to the ‘area’ levels144, respondents, who 
constituted mainly government officials, indicated that they perceive development to 
entail that people should fully participate in all issues affecting their lives. People’s 
                                                 
143 See Map 4 on page xv 
144 See figure 3 on page 54 
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enjoyment of this freedom of participation and choice constituted the ultimate goal of 
development. For example, one government official had this to say about (community) 
development: 
“Our development vision is to achieve full participation of the people.”145
On the other hand, as we move down the continuum from ‘Area’ institutions and actors to 
community level institutions, actors and beneficiaries, development perception assumes a 
more concrete form. Respondents spontaneously and overwhelmingly indicated that 
development means having enough food and clean drinking water. The food referred to 
here included maize, the staple food, and livestock such as chickens and pigs. In this 
context, respondents indicated that most people cannot afford to buy fertilizer for their 
food crops and they pleaded for government support in form of subsidized fertilizer. At 
the time of interviews, subsidized fertilizer was made available to targeted beneficiaries 
across the country through the distribution of coupons which the beneficiaries used to 
buy the subsidized fertilizer. This system however was criticised by research participants 
as flawed as in most instances the previous year, two households had to share one coupon 
hence fertilizer was not enough, as a result they did not harvest bumper and enough yield. 
The following quotation supports this finding: 
“You cannot talk of development if we have no food to eat. Food is scarce here and 
people don’t have money to buy expensive fertilizer to grow their own food. So 
government should distribute enough (fertilizer) coupons to everyone – not that two 
people should share one coupon…”146
Some research participants suggested that government should support them with 
irrigation equipment so that they should not only rely on rain-fed farming. 
Community members also prominently associated development to having disposable 
income. In this context, having small businesses was therefore a sign of development and 
                                                 
145 Government official, IDI 
146 FGD participant, Sinyala Group village 
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participants wished that governments should support them with capital to start small 
businesses such as livestock farming cooperatives. 
In this development discourse, community members mentioned community forest 
resources in as far as they provide energy to prepare food, cure tobacco (for those who 
grow this cash crop), poles for constructing buildings such as houses and animal stalls, 
selling for disposable income, traditional medicines, and wild food such as mushrooms, 
maye and mato fruits. Thus, forest was not an end in itself, but just a means to ends, such 
as good nutrition, decent houses, and disposable income.  
When ranking development indicators therefore, community forest did not feature in the 
top five indicators. Analysis shows that community forest was just a means for survival 
and that given other alternatives such as small businesses and employment, community 
members would rather work for disposable income and buy forest resources elsewhere 
(e.g. Dzalanyama government forest reserve) than work in a community forest. As can be 
appreciated in section 4.6.1 below, this perception had an adverse impact on people’s 
volunteerism in the community based forest management scheme especially that Sinyala 
community had to wait for five years before the community forest would be assessed for 
possible harvesting. This heightened the need for incentives if people were to participate 
in Sinyala community forest conservation. 
Amongst traditional leaders however, much as they subscribed to community forest 
resources as means to ends, they also considered community forest as an end in itself to 
the extent that it preserves traditional medicines and fruits. In this context, traditional 
leaders equated community forest conservation to cultural preservation. 
Other development indicators that were mentioned by community members were free 
schools, free clinics and hospitals, and good road infrastructure for easy communication. 
“We lack a government free hospital here. At the moment we only have Malingunde 
Mission hospital where we pay for the services”147
                                                 
147 FGD participant, Sinyala Joshua village 
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The above findings show a marked difference in development perception and goals 
between meso-level actors and community members, with the former aiming more at 
abstract political rights while the latter emphasizing concrete social and economic rights. 
The implication of this discrepancy is discussed in chapter 5. Suffice it to say however 
that the findings on community forest management presented below strikingly reflect in 
many instances the above different development paradigmatic perceptions. 
4.4 COMMUNITY FOREST RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
REGIMES IN SINYALA 
Analysis of the interviews conducted and relevant documents show that the history of 
community forest management in Sinyala can analytically be deciphered in three main 
regimes: 
1. Open Access Forest Resource Management (1922 – 1998) 
From the time the Chewa settled at Sinyala in 1922 having emigrated from Mozambique 
in search of fertile soil and water, there has been open access to the use of Sinyala forest 
resources. Sinyala residents and other people from surrounding areas such as Mayenje, 
Kasumbu, Mkowa, Mbuna, Poko, and Kawe have been using the forest with little to no 
restriction148. Despite having finite forest resource units, this property right regime was 
presumably sustainable because there were enough, if not many, trees and very few 
appropriators.  
“Since time immemorial, anyone could just go in the forest and cut down trees 
depending on his needs. There was no problem because at that time there were 
very few people and the trees could not be easily depleted. The (village) chief did 
not control the use of the forest that much - except for graveyard trees”149
Having few appropriators and too many forest resources in a way created a perceived 
infinity of Sinyala forest resource units and therefore provided little to no incentive for 
                                                 
148 IDIs with Sinyala traditional leaders and forest officials; Y.B. Mtsitsi (2007) Op. Cit. 
149 Sinyala traditional leader, IDI 
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sustainable management of the resource units by the appropriators. The only attractive 
common property resource management system with minimal transaction cost was 
therefore open access. 
2. Endogenous Community (Self-organized) Forest Resource 
Management (1998 – 2002/3) 
From around 1980s to 1998, there was rapid deforestation in Sinyala forest. In an open 
access system, people cut down trees to use for firewood, for curing tobacco, and poles 
for houses and tobacco shades. The rapid deforestation resulted in shortage of timber, 
firewood, soil erosion, and scarcity of medicinal plants150. This had an adverse impact on 
people’s livelihood as 99% of Sinyala residents relied on forest for energy151. The 
imminent depletion of the forest resources and the impact this had on their livelihood 
gave community members incentive for endogenous collective action to manage the 
resources in a sustainable way. 
In 1998 therefore, the Group Village Headman in Sinyala Group village (and later 
together with the Village Headman for Sinyala Joshua) appointed a group of young men 
to patrol Sinyala forest against encroachers from outside Sinyala villages, and to regulate 
the use of the resources among Sinyala users. People from outside Sinyala were therefore 
denied access to the forest while those from Sinyala were allowed limited and reasonable 
amount of trees per given time. Access criteria for Sinyala appropriators largely 
depended on the discretion of the forest patrol committee in consultation with the village 
headmen152. This step in defining Sinyala forest boundaries and setting up exclusionary 
rules to non-members effectively made Sinyala forest a CPR153. 
Much as the forest patrol committee was not elected by Sinyala community members, it 
enjoyed a wide legitimacy among the community members as the system was 
coordinated by the village headmen – an enduring legitimate cultural institution. 
                                                 
150 See B.Y. Mtsitsi (2007) Op. Cit. 
151 IDI with forest official 
152 IDI with traditional leaders 
153 Well-defined boundaries of an excludable resource that are known to appropriating community is one 
prerequisite for a CPR (see Elinor Ostrom, 2000, Op. Cit.) 
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Research participants also gave an indication that this system was effective in curbing 
over-exploitation of forest resources hence achieving prudent use of the forest resources. 
“Before the current forest committee (VNRMC), the chief would mobilize youths 
from Sinyala to patrol the village forest, and this prevented other villagers from 
cutting down our trees. Some youths especially from Sinyala Joshua were also 
caught by the patrol team when they were cutting down trees without 
authorization”154
This finding shows that the imminent depletion of trees upon which the livelihoods of 
Sinyala community members rested prompted community cooperation among the 
members to manage the forest in a sustainable manner. This confirms Sara Gillinson’s 
conclusion that the likelihood of community cooperation in common property resource 
management is high when the livelihood of the community members is at stake155. 
It is interesting to note however that the planning and implementation of government 
initiated community-based forest management within the decentralized forest 
management in Sinyala from 2002 failed to factor in the community self-organization 
regime that emerged between 1998 and 2002. For example, one forest official had this to 
say: 
“From the 1980s to 2002/3, there was open access to the forest in Sinyala area and 
deforestation was high due to people from Sinyala and surrounding areas fetching 
fire wood, ropes and poles for constructing different structures such as thatching 
houses”156
The open access regime referred to in the above quotation includes the period 1998 to 
2003 in which evidence analysed above shows that Sinyala community initiated 
collective self-management of Sinyala forest that attempted to exclude non-members and 
regulate the use of Sinyala forest as a community property. The Sinyala Participatory 
                                                 
154 FGD participant, Sinyala Group 
155 Sara Gillinson (2004) Op. Cit. 
156 Forest official, IDI 
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Forest Management Plan, a document articulating the community based forest 
management for Sinyala that was facilitated by a forest official, also makes no reference 
to the Sinyala self-organization initiative. The official Sinyala development discourse 
therefore conceptually and institutionally constructed Sinyala forest resource 
management as an open access system that needed the participatory community based 
forest management to avoid the tragedy of the commons. The implications of this official 
oversight of endogenous institutions of forest management are discussed in some detail in 
chapter 5. 
3. Exogenous Community-based Forest Resource Management (2002/3 to 
date) 
Legally, before 1996, all forests on customary (village) or public land belonged to 
government, specifically the Department of Forest. The implication was that people were 
supposed to seek permission from the Forest Department before they use the trees. This, 
according to forest officials interviewed, led to (illegal) deforestation especially in village 
forest areas because communities had no ownership of forests hence did not take 
responsibility. One forest official had this to say about Sinyala before 1996: 
“The problem with Sinyala forest was ownership right. Before 1996, essentially 
all forest was overseen by government. Community forest was under government 
though at village level the village headman was a custodian. The people therefore 
did not take responsibility to manage the forests in a sustainable way. But after 
2003 when we introduced community based forest management, they took 
ownership and are responsible in managing the forest.”157
Empirical evidence in Sinyala however shows that, despite the existence of laws prior to 
1996 that gave ownership rights to the Department of Forest, community members 
claimed ownership of Sinyala forest. Analysis shows that this was the case because of 
community members’ ignorance of the law in the context of lack of enforceability of the 
forest laws in Sinyala due to little or no presence of relevant State arms such as the forest 
                                                 
157 Forest official, IDI 
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department and the police. In this context, the collective action of Sinyala in the forest 
management was determined by the de facto rather than the de jure ownership rights. The 
official assumption therefore, that Sinyala forest was being depleted due to lack of 
ownership and responsibility, was flawed. As explained above, the main factor behind 
Sinyala deforestation before 1998 was the perceived infinity of forest resource units. 
Later, Sinyala community, through village headmen, appointed forest patrol committee to 
exclude non-members and regulate the use of the forest after realizing the imminent 
depletion of the forest. 
After the Malawi government Decentralization and Forestry Policies in 1996, and the 
subsequent Community Based Forest Management paradigm articulated in the 
Supplement to the National Forest policy produced in 2003, Malawi government 
embarked on a participatory forest management under the government decentralization 
institutional framework. Malawi government mainly through the Department of Forestry 
set out to reorient forestry front line staff and community members in all areas in Malawi, 
where there was a village forest, about this new paradigm. The rationale for the 
introduction of community based forest management was 
“…to solve two fundamental problems. The first was the failure of the previous 
policing style of forest management to adequately protect the indigenous forests 
or encourage afforestation. The second was the public perception of naturally 
growing trees and forests as ownerless, or belonging to no-one… the solution to 
both of these problems was found in a single course of action: to transfer the 
ownership of forests to those communities who agreed to protect them and use 
them wisely”158
As can be appreciated in this section (4.4) above, much as the ownership rationale might 
be applicable in other instances, it does not neatly fit the Sinyala case because Sinyala 
community members have been claiming ownership of Sinyala forest since they settled at 
Sinyala in 1922. 
                                                 
158 Government of Malawi (2003) Op. Cit. p. 1 
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Following the new Decentralization and Forestry policies therefore, the Forestry officials 
consulted Sinyala village headmen and informed them of the advantages of forest 
conservation and the need to transfer government ownership of Sinyala forest to Sinyala 
community on condition that the community adopts the government community based 
forest management plan159. The government officials advised the village headmen to 
disband the forest patrol group appointed by the village headmen and replace it with 
VNRMC. The rationale was that the VNRMC would be democratically elected by 
community members and would be composed of literate people who would easily absorb 
modern ways of forest conservation as per forest officials’ technical advice. The patrol 
group was said to be illiterate and not democratically elected (appointed by the Group 
Village Headman)160. Analysis of in-depth interviews with traditional leaders shows that 
they came to terms with this official ‘condition’ or ‘directive’ because government 
(forest) officials are experts and their advice is rarely ignored. 
Interviews with VDC members however show dissatisfaction with the way the VNRMC 
was introduced. They indicated that VNRMC was set up without consulting the VDC – a 
committee that co-ordinates and oversees development activities at village level. The 
VDC was only informed at a later stage when the Area Development Committee (ADC) 
members sensitized them of the need for VNRMC. This reveals some top-down approach 
to community development where development plans that directly affect communities are 
hatched at higher levels of development institutions and are imposed on the communities 
without proper consultation. This development set a bad precedent as the Sinyala 
VNRMC now operates as an independent committee and its activities are not properly 
synergized within the broader development plan of Sinyala as will be appreciated below 
in section 4.5.2 when we analyse the activities of the VNRMC and the interface between 
the VNRMC and the VDC. 
In 2002/3 therefore, with the involvement of VNRMC and Sinyala community members, 
and using such participatory tools as transect walk, stakeholder analysis and problem tree 
analysis, the forest technical assistant (FTA) facilitated a forest management plan for 
                                                 
159 IDIs with traditional leaders, forest officials, VNRMC members, and FGDs with community members 
160 IDI with traditional leaders 
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Sinyala. The Participatory Forest Management Plan contains the general profile of 
Sinyala, stakeholder analysis of forest users outlining their roles and responsibilities, 
forest resource assessment (types of trees available and their usefulness), plan of action 
and timelines, rules regulating management of the forest, the VNRMC constitution, and 
endorsement from traditional leaders, forest official and VNRMC representatives. The 
plan was informed by forest resource assessment that revealed that Sinyala forest needs 
to be conserved for 5 years (from 2003 to 2008) before community members could start 
using it161.  
The forest conservation would among other things involve reafforestation, pruning 
existing trees, making fire-breaks and the VNRMC patrolling the forest to prevent 
encroachment. Community participation in the conservation is voluntary but the VNRMC 
maintains a register of those who participate. The dynamics and implications of this 
voluntary participation are expounded below in the section on volunteerism and 
incentives, and in chapter 5. 
The Forest Department, especially through the FTA, provides technical support in 
conserving Sinyala forest in such areas as afforestation methods, pruning and making 
firebreaks. These conservation techniques were missing in the endogenous community 
(self-organized) forest resource management (1998-2002). The introduction of these 
methods therefore underpins the importance of development change agents in providing 
technical support that may be lacking at community level as articulated by such scholars 
as Kingsbury162. 
The Sinyala Participatory Plan also represents the official transfer of ownership of 
Sinyala forest from Malawi government to Sinyala community, and this is duly endorsed 
by the District Commissioner (DC), Director of Forestry, traditional leaders and VNRMC 
chairperson163. The Participatory Plan sets rules excluding other communities from using 
the forest and puts forth penalties in cases of violation164. These rules are in accordance 
                                                 
161 See B. Y. Mtsitsi (2007) Op. Cit. 
162 Damien Kingsbury (2004) Op. Cit. 
163 B. Y. Mtsitsi (2007) Op. Cit. 
164 Ibid, pp. 19-20 
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with the Forest Policy and Act and are enforceable by the Police and the DC. This 
synergy among community and State institutions in community forest management 
signifies a deliberate concerted institutional co-management of community forest under 
the decentralized forest management. This has the potential of making community 
conservation effective because, since meso-level institutions have jurisdiction over and 
above communities, they can easily co-ordinate and enforce rules across communities. 
For example, there was a situation where members of another community encroached on 
Sinyala forest. Since Sinyala traditional leaders cannot impose their rules in another 
community, the fact that their forest conservation rules and sanctions are recognised by 
such meso-level institutions as the District Assembly and the Police made it possible for 
the encroachers to be prosecuted. 
The overall aim of the Participatory Management Plan is therefore 
“…to fully empower the communities of Sinyala so that they are able to make 
their own informed and constructive decisions and take responsibilities and 
promote collective action for the protection, management and sustainable 
utilization of the forestry resources…”165
However, much as the participatory process used the Sinyala community language 
(Chichewa), the plan was compiled in English language despite the fact that most people 
in Sinyala cannot understand English166. The facilitator of the process and forest officials 
could not give reasons why the plan was in English but indicated that the plan would be 
translated to Chichewa. Interviews with VNRMC and community members revealed that 
the community did not have the compiled plan let alone any reference record of the plan. 
This is intriguing given that the process that started in 2002/3, and most of whose 
beneficiaries do not understand English, could be in English and that the communities, 
who are the intended beneficiaries, would not have any reference materials. The 
researcher sourced a copy of the plan from the Department of Forest offices, and the 
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166 Findings with research participants in Sinyala 
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forest officials also indicated that the DC had a copy. The implications of this finding are 
discussed in some depth in the following chapter. 
4.5 COMMUNITY BASED FOREST MANAGEMENT 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
Analysis of the findings shows that the following institutional structures are crucial in the 
management of forest resources at Sinyala community: traditional village headmen, 
VNRMC and VDC at micro-level; and AEC and ADC at Meso-level167. The ANRMC, 
much as it is provided for in the formal institutional framework, is non-existent in the 
management of Sinyala forest. This was attributed to the fact that community based forest 
management is just in its infancy and more structures would be put in place in due 
course168. Our discussion will therefore focus on traditional leadership, VNRMC, VDC, 
AEC and ADC, with selected references to the District Assembly level where 
appropriate. 
The following diagram illustrates our area of concentration. 
Figure 4: Forest Resource Management Institutional Framework in Sinyala 
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4.5.1 Traditional Authorities 
According to the local government structure under the 1996 Decentralization Policy, the 
1996 Forest Policy, and the 2003 Community Based Forest Management policy, all 
traditional leaders at all levels of governance are supposed to be non-voting ex-officio 
members. Thus, TAs at District Assembly level, TAs and Group Village Headmen at 
ADC level, and Group Village Headmen and Village Headmen at VDC level, are only 
allowed to play an advisory role by virtue of their traditional leadership and not to make 
decisions169. In figure 4 above, the institution of traditional leaders is not shown as it is 
attached to all main development institutional structures at all levels. 
In Sinyala, the Group Village Headman Sinyala and the Village Headman Sinyala Joshua 
are both non-voting ex-officio members of Sinyala VNRMC and Sinyala VDC. The 
Group Village Headman is also an ex-officio member of the ADC. However, findings 
show that traditional leaders especially at VDC level (and VNRMC as a sub-committee 
of VDC), play roles beyond advisory role to, oftentimes, include assent, veto and even 
overruling powers regarding VDC and VNRMC decisions. One forest official had this to 
say regarding traditional leaders’ powers at village level: 
“In reality, most powers lie with the (traditional) chief, he can overrule VNRMC 
decisions sometimes since he is the custodian of all ownership. VNRMC is sort of 
the chief’s delegation in management of forest resource”170
Research results show that VNRMC, VDC and community members acknowledge and in 
most cases accept this de facto powers and influence of traditional leaders thereby 
making them legitimate. The implication of this reality is discussed further in the 
following chapter. 
                                                 
169 See for instance, Asiyati Chiweza in N. Patel and L. Svasand (Eds) (2007), Op. Cit.; Government of 
Malawi (2003) Op. Cit. 
170 Forest official, IDI 
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4.5.2 The VNRMC 
Structurally, the VNRMC is a sub-committee of VDC171. As indicated elsewhere in this 
paper, it was set up to coordinate and oversee Sinyala forest management under the 
community based forest management system. 
Elections 
The Sinyala VNRMC was elected by community members from Sinyala Group and 
Sinyala Joshua in 2003 in order to replace the Sinyala forest patrol group appointed by 
the Group Village Headman. This was done on the advice of the forest officials to adopt 
community based forest management. One VNRMC was elected to represent the two 
villages. This was because the two villages share one forest area (and are historically 
related as explained in the profile of Sinyala in section 4.2 above). Literacy of potential 
VNRMC members was one of the criteria for the election. Thus, the VNRMC constitutes 
democratically elected literate representatives of Sinyala villages to manage the Sinyala 
forest. Being a committee representing two villages that use the same resources, the 
VNRMC provide an ideal forum for facilitating cooperation among the two villages. 
Activities 
The VNRMC basically co-ordinates and oversees all activities at Sinyala forest such as 
planting seedlings, making firebreaks, pruning trees, coordinating any forest assessment 
in liaison with the Forest Technical Assistant, patrolling the forest area, and referring any 
violation of the community forest rules to the village headman, the police or the DC. 
To keep truck of volunteers who work at the forest, the VNRMC keeps a register. This 
they said would help when sharing forest trees or the proceeds from selling the forest 
trees once the Forest Technical Assistant advises that the trees are ready for 
harvesting172. The register also helps to allocate incentives to work in the forest, such as 
fertilizer, provided by external organizations that have an interest in forest conservation. 
                                                 
171 See figures 3 and 4 on pages 54 and 69 
172 IDI with VNRMC member 
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The Forest Department organizes periodic trainings for the VNRMC members e.g. 
making firebreaks. The idea is that the VNRMC members should teach community 
members when they are back from such trainings. 
Meetings and Decision making 
The VNRMC meets on average twice a month where they discuss relevant issues on 
Sinyala forest management. As ex-officio members of VNRMC, the village headmen are 
supposed to attend these meetings but often attend at their discretion (depending on their 
workload). 
The VNRMC often consults especially the Group Village Headman on most crucial 
decisions. As discussed above, in reality, the Group Village Headman can veto VNRMC 
decisions and is essentially the one who should assent to most decisions. 
Evaluating the activities of Sinyala VNRMC, community members from Sinyala Group 
expressed satisfaction with the committee and indicated that they are updated on its 
activities and get trained in modern ways of forest conservation by the committee 
members. On the other hand, community members from Sinyala Joshua expressed 
dissatisfaction with VNRMC. They indicated that they are not consulted on most 
decisions and don’t get any training from committee members. One Sinyala Joshua 
participant had this to say: 
“the committee don’t consult us and most of us don’t know what goes on in the 
committee and any plans regarding Sinyala forest. We are just told what to do – 
‘tomorrow let’s go and work at the forest’. We want them to consult us and also 
teach us what they learn at the forest office (department)”173
The discrepancy between Sinyala Group and Sinyala Joshua’s evaluation of VNRMC’s 
role signify deep rooted animosity between the two villages that dates back to their 
leadership squabbles that led to the split of Sinyala in 1994174. This raises co-
                                                 
173 Sinyala Joshua research participant, FGD. 
174 See section 4.2 on Sinyala profile above. 
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management conflict between the two villages to the extent that reluctance of most 
Sinyala Joshua community members to participate is attributed to this feeling of being 
sidelined. Much as both villages are represented in the VNRMC, analysis of positions 
distribution also shows that key positions are held by Sinyala Group representatives as 
the table below shows: 
 Table 2: Distribution of positions in Sinyala VNRMC 
Sinyala Group Sinyala Joshua 
Chairman Vice Chairman 
Secretary Vice Secretary 
 Treasurer 
Committee members almost equally distributed
If we factor in the fact that Group Village headman Sinyala, who is senior to Village 
Headman Sinyala Joshua, holds the de facto  assent and veto powers within the VNRMC,  
and given past record of the Group Village Headman’s favouritism in arbitrating 
disputes175, a huge potential for Sinyala Joshua being sidelined becomes evident. 
4.5.3 The VDC 
The Village Development Committee (VDC) is the main committee at village level to 
coordinate and oversee all community development initiatives and activities. In this 
context, the VNRMC is a sub-committee of the VDC176. 
The Sinyala VDC coordinates and oversees development activities in 11 villages headed 
by the Group Village Headman Sinyala. 
Elections 
Sinyala VDC, analyzed at the time of the fieldwork, was elected in 2005. The VDC 
chairperson reported that the VDC was elected by all the 11 villages. Each village met 
and chose representatives who later competed for VDC positions at a meeting of the 11 
                                                 
175 See for instance section 4.6.2 below 
176 See figure 3 on page 54 
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villages. This process was initiated by the Group Village Headman following the advice 
from the TA. 
Activities 
The activities of VDC can be divided in two main categories: coordinating and assisting 
externally initiated community development activities; and initiating and coordinating 
internally initiated community development activities.  
Externally initiated development normally originates from development NGOs and 
central government. They include such projects as building of school blocks. The VDC 
then help to mobilize the community to assist in the implementation of such projects 
through, for example, moulding bricks. One VDC official had this to say about the role of 
VDC in such cases: 
“When development agents such as NGOs want to initiate some development in 
our area such as schools, they consult us (VDC) to oversee the project, for 
instance, making sure that building materials are kept well and are safe, that the 
community participates, and there is accountability”177
Internally initiated development normally originates through village feedback 
mechanisms such as village meetings called by village headmen where community 
members express their needs; and at VDC meetings where committee members articulate 
community needs based upon their experiences and contacts with the community.  
The main problem to realize the community needs in demand driven development 
projects is funding and technical support. Within the local governance arrangement, the 
VDC channel their demands and apply for support from the District Development Fund 
(DDF) located at the District Assembly level. There are also some development 
organizations and agencies who, through the local government system, get the 
community proposals and provide funds.  
                                                 
177 Sinyala VDC official, IDI 
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“We (VDC) have so far initiated the construction of a road. The procedure 
demanded that we should get a proposal form from the TA or MP (member of 
parliament), fill it and submit to the DC or MALESA (Malawi Enterprise Zone 
Association)” 
Despite this possibility of funding, enough funding remains elusive. The VDC also 
expressed dissatisfaction with the bureaucracy that delays the proposal development 
process such as getting the forms, articulating the demands according to the requirements 
of the forms, submitting the forms and waiting for a response. As a result most 
community demands such as more bore holes remain a dream. 
Meetings and Decision Making 
The VDC meet twice a month and sometimes more if there is an on-going project. As 
with other local government structures, Group Village Headman Sinyala is an ex-officio 
member of Sinyala VDC. Decisions are made by consensus and / or voting depending on 
the degree of controversy of an issue. The Group Village Headman is said to attend the 
meetings erratically and is also consulted on most decisions. However, much as he has 
some influence on some decisions especially the ones that will affect the community 
members directly such as community mobilization to participate in project 
implementation, his influence is not as strong as at VNRMC which oversees only two 
villages and hence is closer to the community members. 
4.5.4 The ADC and AEC 
The ADC and the AEC are treated at the same time in this section, not only because the 
AEC is a technical arm of the ADC, but because findings show that in Sinyala, the ADC 
is not active, and that it is the AEC members who assist the micro-level institutions 
directly, often representing their parent ministries. The research results show that the 
ADC is practically defunct. The AEC also does not exist as a coherent technical support 
and development coordinating sub-committee, but as a loose collection of independent 
government front line officers who represent their parent government ministries and 
interact with communities directly in their areas of specialty as part of their routine job. 
 75  
 
These government front line officers include Health Surveillance Assistants, Agricultural 
Extension Workers and Forest technical Assistants (FTAs). 
Forest officials who are supposed to be AEC members had little to say about the ADC 
and the AEC as coherent development coordinating bodies. They indicated that there is 
little link between ADC and AEC on the one hand, and VDC and VNRMC on the other. 
Given this finding, we reconstruct figure 4 to reflect a true institutional (loose) link on the 
ground. 
Figure 5: Empirical Sinyala Forest Resource Management Institutional 
Framework 
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As figure 5 above shows, such government officers as the FTA work directly with the 
VDC and VNRMC (shown by solid lines) and there is a loose connection among the 
government experts, the AEC and the ADC (shown by dotted lines between the FTA and 
AEC, and between AEC and ADC). The block at ADC level has been removed to show 
the inactiveness of the ADC. The dotted lines between the ADC and the VDC, and 
between the VDC and the VNRMC show the loose communication among these 
institutions as per the findings. The implications of this reality are discussed in chapter 5. 
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4.6 CHALLENGES TO SINYALA COMMUNITY FOREST 
MANAGEMENT 
The findings presented so far show that Sinyala community forest management 
encounters a lot of challenges. This section only presents the cross-cutting challenges.  
The challenges are articulated in three main categories namely: low spirit of volunteerism 
among community members, encroachment especially from surrounding villages, and 
lack of equipment for conserving the forest. 
4.6.1 Low Spirit of Volunteerism and Need for Incentives 
Research participants, from forest officials, traditional leaders to community members, 
prominently cited low spirit of volunteerism as one challenge facing the management of 
Sinyala forest. Some people do not render their services to conserve the forest such as 
planting seedlings and pruning. Of those who do, many do so erratically. 
 “most people here are very reluctant to volunteer to work at the forest”178
And a forest official best articulates the reason for the low volunteerism: 
“Not everyone participate in say taking care of seedlings - like building fences 
around the seedlings. People always need incentives. I think this is because they 
don’t have patience as forest conservation takes a lot of time say 5 years for the 
community to see the benefits.”179
Interviews showed that since 2003, Sinyala forest conservation programme has led to 
shortage of firewood and income from wood, timber and charcoal sales, among 
community members. This is because the Forest Technical Assistant advised that the 
community should wait for 5 years before they can assess whether the forest is ready for 
harvesting. As a result, most people resorted to alternative sources of wood energy such 
as buying and/or stealing trees from Dzalanyama and Katete government forest reserves. 
Some people use natural or planted trees from their gardens or other areas that do not fall 
                                                 
178 Traditional leader, Sinyala, IDI 
179 Forest official, Sinyala, IDI 
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under the conserved Sinyala community forest. These alternatives in turn act as 
disincentives for volunteering to work in a forest whose benefits will only be realised at 
least after 5 years. 
To solve this problem, the VNRMC and the Forest Technical Assistant decided to allow 
those who volunteer to work at the forest to get pruned branches of trees and wood from 
cleared fire-breaks to use as firewood or sell for income. Much as this is not enough to 
cater for shortage of firewood, it gives incentives to most people who can not afford to 
buy firewood or don’t have enough trees of their own to volunteer in conserving Sinyala 
forest. 
Research also shows that those who do not volunteer face the feeling of shame and some 
social punishments such as ostracism. Such cultural incentives have also been responsible 
for most people opting to volunteer at least once in a while. 
External organizations and institutions with an interest in natural resource conservation 
have also taken several initiatives to encourage community members to participate in 
Sinyala forest conservation. For example, the District Assembly pledged and distributed 
two bags of fertilizer to each household that participated in forest conservation. Farm 
Income Diversification Programme (FIDP), a programme under the Ministry of 
Agriculture, also donated bee hives for bee keeping as an incentive to those who 
participate in the forest conservation180. 
These incentives have resulted in increase in number of volunteers who work at the 
forest, at least during the time the incentives are administered. One traditional leader gave 
this testimony: 
“…one organization came here and offered fertilizer and seeds to people who 
volunteered to work at the forest. About 113 (out of 175) families volunteered – 
up from (about) 60 families who had been working before the pledge”181
                                                 
180 Ibid; IDI with traditional leaders; IDI with VNRMC member 
181 Traditional leader, Sinyala, IDI 
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However, these incentives also raise the problem of free-riding. Some people who do not 
work at the forest want to benefit from most of these incentives. The free-riding spirit 
gave rise to a pandemonium at one instance during distribution of the incentives to the 
extent that the police was called to contain the situation182. The VNRMC therefore 
maintains a register of those who work at the forest and they use this to determine 
beneficiaries of pruned tree branches, honey sales proceeds (from bee keeping in the 
forest), and incentives from external organizations. The VNRMC also indicated that the 
beneficiaries of the forest resources after harvesting will also be determined by the 
register183. 
4.6.2 Encroachment 
There was reported encroachment at the forest by some members of surrounding villages 
and from Sinyala community. The VNRMC therefore patrols the forest to minimize this 
tendency. Once caught, the rules set up by the Sinyala community that were also 
circulated to surrounding villages and are endorsed by the police and the DC are 
invoked184. 
There are however reported incidences of favouritism when the encroachers are from 
Sinyala community and when the Group Village Headman is the arbiter. It was reported 
that offenders from Sinyala Joshua village have received stiff punishment while those 
from Sinyala Group have gone scot-free. Members of Sinyala Joshua and forest officials 
interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with this favouritism. As presented elsewhere in 
this paper, this unfair treatment dates back to leadership and forest ownership squabbles 
between Sinyala Group and Sinyala Joshua villages the co-management implications of 
which are discussed in chapter 5. 
4.6.3 Lack of Equipment 
Traditional leaders and community members interviewed also reported lack of proper 
equipment as a challenge to forest conservation. They indicated that they lack such 
                                                 
182 IDI with traditional leader 
183 IDI with VNRMC member 
184 See B.Y. Mtsitsi (2007) Op. Cit. pp. 19-20 
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equipment as slashers and fire extinguishers. As a solution, most people use their 
household equipment such as hoes to work at the forest but indicated they needed more 
and appropriate equipment. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has highlighted the dynamics that play out in Sinyala community as the 
community based forest management under the decentralized governance system is being 
implemented. Key to the findings is the persistent compatibility and complimentarily 
wrestling between meso-level and micro-level institutions; and between indigenous 
(traditional) and exogenous (government-initiated) institutions. The following chapter 
discusses these findings by isolating some themes that have an implication on our depth 
understanding of these dynamics and enable us to recommend possible optimal 
institutional interface. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS: IMPLICATIONS OF MICRO- 
AND MESO-LAYERS GOVERNANCE INTERFACE IN 
SINYALA COMMUNITY FOREST MANAGEMENT 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the findings presented in chapter 4. To assess and draw lessons 
from the findings presented in chapter 4, concepts, theories and general practice of 
collective action and local governance discussed in chapters 2 and 3 are used as 
yardsticks to measure the empirical evidence in chapter 4. At the same time, the empirical 
evidence provides insights regarding the applicability of the theoretical perspective185. 
The analysis also draws insights from comparing the evidence as it unfolds before and 
after the introduction of formal community based forest management within the 
decentralized framework. 
The chapter shows striking implications of the micro- and meso-level institutional 
interface in community forest management in particular, and community development in 
general. In summary, this chapter argues that the introduction of community based forest 
management by the Malawian government in Sinyala did not engage sufficiently with the 
communities involved and did not take adequate account of long standing social, cultural 
and historical factors peculiar to Sinyala communities. This sparked a state of 
institutional and behavioural disequilibrium given the enduring indigenous community 
institutions and community members’ development expectations. There is a mismatch 
between the rationale for and subsequent institution of community based forest 
management on the one hand, and indigenous institutions and people’s expectations on 
the other. 
                                                 
185 See analysing case studies in J. Chima ‘What’s the Utility of Case Study Method for Social Science 
Research? A Response to critiques from the quantitative/statistical perspective.’ Paper presented to the 
Annual Congress of the American Political Science Association, 2005 
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Analyzing this from the perspective of a forest resource management system in transition, 
whose benefits are yet to be realized by community members, there are however 
prospects for an eventual equilibrium especially when the influence of indigenous 
institutions is acknowledged, community development expectations are taken into 
consideration and embedded in the community based forest management, and when 
meso- and micro-level institutional coordination is improved. 
5.1 SELF-ORGANIZATION STINT IN SINYALA COMMUNITY 
FOREST MANAGEMENT (1998-2002) 
The period from 1998 to 2002 stands out as significant in the history of Sinyala 
community forest management. This is because, after a long period of open access to 
Sinyala forest, and the community realization of the imminent depletion of forest 
resources upon which their livelihood depended, the community self-mobilized to 
manage the forest in a sustainable way. The forest patrol group that was formed 
commanded a reasonable level of legitimacy and managed to prevent further depletion of 
the forest. This type of self-organization that happened in the context of significant 
autonomy from external influence is what has been highlighted by such CPR scholars as 
Elinor Ostrom as an effective form of common property resource management as it is 
spontaneous and legitimate186. The Sinyala experience is also consistent with Sarah 
Gillinson’s findings that where the livelihood of resource users is perceived to depend on 
the resources, chances of the user community self-organizing to manage the resources are 
high187.  
This finding implies that communities’ propensity to adopt sustainable self-management 
of CPRs is (at least partly) dependent on the perceived negative effect on their livelihoods 
of not doing so. This presents a perfect opportunity for community development meso-
level institutions and development change agents who are experts in specific CPRs, to 
mobilize community members to adopt sustainable ways of managing CPRs by merely 
                                                 
186 See for example Elinor Ostrom (2000) Op. Cit. Also see the discussion on Self-Organization in chapter 
2. 
187 Sara Gillinson (2004) Op. Cit. 
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sparking debate in communities on the livelihood risks of unsustainable use of CPRs. 
This approach is likely to result in spontaneous and legitimate response from the 
communities as they will have critically engaged with the potential risks and benefits vis-
à-vis their livelihoods and would come up with an informed choice regarding the CPR 
management, either fully home-grown or in consultation with the development change 
agents. This approach is remarkably different from the top-down approach where experts 
from meso-level institutions dictate to communities on what to do, instead of sparking 
debate in the communities regarding the livelihood risks and benefits of specific choices 
on specific CPRs, and providing space for the communities to engage with that before 
making legitimate choices. 
5.2 CONCEPTUALIZING COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: MESO- 
VS MICRO-LEVELS PERSPECTIVES 
One overarching factor that had an implication on the implementation of community 
based forest management in Sinyala was the marked difference in conceptualization of 
community development between meso-level development institutions and actors on the 
one hand, and micro-level development institutions, actors and beneficiaries on the other.  
At the meso-level, community development indicators were succinctly articulated as 
people’s freedom to participate in issues affecting their lives. This conceptualization is 
consistent with contemporary human development discourse such as Amartya Sen’s 
‘development as freedom’188, and is often used as one of the human development 
indicators by such international organizations as the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP).  
On the other hand, community members and micro-level institutions and actors 
conceived development to entail the satisfaction of more concrete social and economic 
rights such as food, water, disposable income, and clinics. This shows that communities 
and development agents have different (levels of) indicators upon which they plan and 
evaluate development initiatives. This was manifested by, for instance, the communities 
                                                 
188 See Amartya Sen (1999) Development as Freedom, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
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largely expressing dissatisfaction with their development status because they did not have 
enough food, clean water, disposable income, and firewood. On the other hand, meso-
level institutions and actors largely expressed satisfaction with community development 
processes in that structures such as the VNRMC were put in place to facilitate people’s 
participation in issues affecting their lives. What was remaining therefore was to change 
people’s mindset regarding taking ownership of the community forests and taking 
responsibility over the management of the forests189.  
A critical analysis however reveals that, in poverty stricken areas such as Sinyala, 
freedom to participate is more of a development strategy or development process 
indicator than a development outcome indicator. The needs that community members 
articulated represent the desired outcomes of development that will impact on the 
community members having long and healthy lives. This subtle distinction between 
development processes and outcomes in poor communities must be clarified in 
community development conception, planning and implementation at all levels of 
development. Development change agents should go beyond being satisfied with 
participation enabling institutions, and ensure that these institutions work efficiently and 
effectively to facilitate the satisfaction of people’s needs. Thus, in the context of rampant 
poverty, freedom to participate is not enough as the mark of development success, but the 
satisfaction of people’s concrete and social rights. 
5.3 DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE: OFFICIAL CONSTRUCTION 
OF SINYALA AS AN OPEN ACCESS REGIME 
Interviews with government forest officials indicate that the main reason for deforestation 
and hence the need for the introduction of community based forest management in 
Sinyala was lack of community member ownership and responsibility over the village 
forest. This is because the forest belonged to government and most community members 
considered it ‘ownerless’190.  
                                                 
189 IDIs with forest officials 
190 See chapter 4 
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Empirical evidence however shows that Sinyala community members have been 
perceiving themselves as bona fide ownership right holders of Sinyala forest since they 
settled at Sinyala in 1922. To them, the main cause of deforestation was initially the 
perceived infinity of forest resource units that resulted in wasteful use of the forest 
resources191. The official baseline situation analysis of Sinyala to justify the initiation of 
community based forest management is therefore at best biased and at worst flawed. This 
is however intelligible in the context that ownership and responsibility were the general 
standard official reasons used by meso-level institutions and development agents to 
justify the introduction of community based forest management in Malawi192. In the case 
of Sinyala however, much as strengthening of ownership through institutionalization and 
enforcement of exclusionary rules vis-à-vis non-members seemed to improve 
conservation of Sinyala forest, empirical evidence shows that the momentum for 
sustainable collective forest management was already emerging when people realized the 
imminent depletion of forest resources and the risks this would have on their livelihoods. 
That is why in 1998, five years before the introduction of community forest management 
programme in Sinyala, the community set up a village forest patrol committee. This 
initiative is consistent with Ostrom’s conclusion that CPR users with long-term 
communal ownership claims and who can communicate amongst themselves, develop 
their own agreements, establish positions of monitors, and sanctions those who do not 
conform to their own rules193. 
Research findings further show that the official analysis of forest resource management in 
Sinyala does not recognize the indigenous initiatives to manage the Sinyala forest 
between 1998 and 2002. They categorise this period, and indeed any period prior to the 
introduction of the community based forest management in 2003, as open access era with 
imminent, if not fait accompli, tragedy of the commons. This points to the manner in 
                                                 
191 See chapter 4 
192 For instance, the preamble to ‘Community Based Forest Management – a supplement to the National 
Forest Policy of Malawi, 1996’,  states that the Malawi National Forest Policy was aimed at solving the 
problem of  “…the public perception of naturally growing trees and forests as ownerless” (Government of 
Malawi, 2003, Op. Cit. p. 1); During the interviews with forest officials, they also used the ‘ownership’ 
rationale to justify introduction of community based forest management in Sinyala in particular, and in 
village forest areas in general. 
193 Elinor Ostrom (2000) Op. Cit. 
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which official government discourse has failed to understand local historical and socio-
cultural dynamics. Acknowledgement of the importance of earlier endogenous 
community-based attempts at forest management would have achieved far better results. 
The official Sinyala development analysis and discourse before 2003 therefore 
constructed, both conceptually and institutionally, Sinyala forest resource management as 
an open access system that lacked communal ownership and that needed an (external) 
intervention to introduce community based forest management regime. The pre-
determined community based forest resource management paradigm embedded in the 
Forest Policy and subsequent policy documents, therefore, resulted in selective and 
biased use of Sinyala empirical situation to justify the paradigm’s implementation.  
This biased development needs assessment, analysis and discourse by development 
change agents that is aimed at justifying implementation of pre-determined development 
concepts and strategies is not uncommon among development academics and 
practitioners. For instance, James Ferguson shows how the Thaba-Tseka rural 
development project in Lesotho in the 1980s reflected the pre-conceived development 
strategies of the World Bank (the project’s funder) and the government of Lesotho, and 
ignored the empirical realities on the ground, hence its failure194.  
Thus, informed by the flawed assumptions and bias towards formally organised or 
institutionalised systems of management, the Forest Department facilitated the 
replacement of the indigenous Sinyala patrol group with the literate and democratically 
elected VNRMC. This is intelligible in the context that modern ways of managing forests 
                                                 
194 For instance, James Ferguson shows that Lesotho poverty was compounded by low wages, political 
subjugation by South Africa, denial of political rights, corrupt bureaucratic elites, and structural 
unemployment due to South Africa influx control measures against potential labourers. He claimed by 
quoting authorities on Lesotho studies, like Ashton (1952) and Encyclopaedia Britannica (1910) that, 
impediment to “development” of Lesotho did not lie necessarily in lack of roads and markets, lack of 
training and education, lack of agricultural inputs, unfamiliarity with a money economy, and lack of credit 
as the World Bank alleged. He however indicated that this distortion of facts by the World Bank is not to be 
dismissed as a mistake but should be considered as meaningful in the context of the World Bank 
development discourse whose notion of development implied a progress towards modern capitalism (See 
James Ferguson (1990) The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic 
Power in Lesotho Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) 
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like growing and managing seedlings of different varieties need literate individuals195; 
and that in a democratic dispensation, structures that make decisions affecting people 
must have the mandate of the targeted people, and one way this can be achieved is 
through democratic elections. However, the disbandment of the Sinyala patrol group, that 
emerged through self-organization initiatives, in a way killed the spirit of volunteerism as 
Sinyala residents started looking up to the government as ‘auntie-knows-best’. 
Participation of Sinyala residents in the introduced community based forest management 
therefore needed more incentives than ever before196. This shows the adverse effect of 
top-down invitation to bottom-up participation in community development that ignores 
indigenous institutions and initiatives hence lacks meaningful societal embeddedness, 
spontaneity and legitimacy197. 
Much as there was a lack of legal community ownership of Sinyala forest and some 
laxity in the indigenous forest patrol system in Sinyala, a successful introduction of 
community based forest management needed to engage with realities on the ground, such 
as the perceived infinity of forest resources and free-riding in the context of existing 
indigenous institutions. This would result in a different approach to community based 
forest management in Sinyala where, other than disbanding the indigenous forest patrol 
system, it could be improved through, for instance, reviewing recruitment criteria of the 
members of the patrol group, their representation, tenure of office; strengthening forest 
management rules to curb free-riding, and training the group in new forest management 
methods such as reafforestation techniques. This approach could build on home-grown 
solutions hence increasing legitimacy and effective sustainable management of the forest 
resources. At the time of the fieldwork, evidence showed that the VNRMC lacked 
meaningful legitimacy among some community members. For example, some 
community members from Sinyala Joshua village and members of the VDC expressed 
reservations regarding the institutionalization of the VNRMC and its activities in that 
they were not consulted and some felt sidelined in its decision making and activities. 
                                                 
195 The field findings actually show that the forest management trainings that the VNRMC members 
attended needed some minimum levels of literacy 
196 Lack of volunteerism and need for incentives is discussed in some detail in section 5.7.2. 
197 For discussion on societal embeddedness, spontaneity and legitimacy, see chapter 2; Michael Schatzberg 
(2001) Op. Cit.; Louise Comfort (1994) Op. Cit.  
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It should be noted however that this paper is not categorically dismissing ‘lack of 
ownership’ as a justification for community based forest management, neither is it 
undermining the benefits of this facilitated participatory forest management regime. The 
argument however is that forest management interventions should be context specific. In 
areas where CPR depletion is due to people recognizing the value of CPR but not owning 
it, facilitating ownership is crucial. On the other hand, in areas where people already feel 
they own the CPR but previously they perceived the resource units as infinite and are 
now attempting some community management of the resources, as is the case with 
Sinyala, the development change agents should acknowledge this reality and ignite 
debate in the community on the cost of depletion of the resources and assist the people to 
strengthen their home-grown institutions. 
5.4 DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE: THE PARTICIPATORY PLAN 
‘HOAX’? 
Related to the development discourse discussed above is the participatory forest 
management plan for Sinyala, facilitated by forest officials. Using participatory methods, 
the forest officials facilitated the forest management plan and articulated it in a 
Participatory Management Plan document198. The participatory planning process was 
valuable in that it managed to mobilize community members to participate in the 
planning of the management of their forest. 
However, the manner in which the plans were articulated, recorded, and used, leaves a lot 
to be desired. The plan whose process commenced in 2003 in the local language, 
Chichewa, was compiled in 2007 in English language despite the fact that most Sinyala 
community members cannot understand English. Forest officials interviewed, all of 
whom understood and spoke the Sinyala local language of Chichewa, which also happens 
to be the Malawi national language, could not give reasons for compiling the report in 
English, but indicated, as an after-thought, that the plan would be translated (back) to 
                                                 
198 See chapter 4 and Appendices 
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Chichewa199. Besides, findings show that neither Sinyala VNRMC nor Sinyala traditional 
leaders, let alone community members interviewed, had the planning document, much as 
they remembered going through some planning process. This finding renders the 
planning process and document less useful because the intended beneficiaries neither 
have nor can they understand the final plan. They, therefore, continue looking up to the 
compilers of ‘their’ plan to ‘decode’ what is in the plan and tell them what to do. This 
perpetuates top-down development approach and community dependency on formal 
institutions and actors to satisfy their community needs. Low volunteerism and 
dependency among community members, discussed below, can therefore be reasonably 
attributed to this induced top-down community development approach.  
To unpack this top-down community development approach manifesting itself in Sinyala 
community, the question we should probably ask is: who is the real target audience of the 
Sinyala forest management plan? 
It can reasonably be speculated that development change agents in Sinyala were primarily 
concerned about impressing and satisfying the development logic of the initiators and 
funders of the community based forest management project. It is interesting to note that 
the technical and financial support of the community based forest management process in 
Sinyala was from the European Union (EU); United States aid agency (USAID) under the 
project entitled Community Partnership for Sustainable Resource Management in Malawi 
(COMPASS); and the Department of Forestry. COMPASS and the Department of 
Forestry are acknowledged on the front cover of the Sinyala Participatory Forest 
Management Plan document200. Analysis of other policy and strategic documents also 
shows that the EU and USAID provided technical support and funds for the formulation 
of standards and guidelines for participatory forestry in Malawi with the aim of 
improving forest governance and rural livelihoods201. Satisfying the project funders, 
                                                 
199 It is interesting to note that copies of Participatory Forest Management Plan from other village forest 
areas like Sendwe, which the researcher found at the Forestry Office, were also all in English. This shows 
that the recording process in Sinyala was not a mistake but an institutionalized practice. 
200 See the cover of the Participatory Plan in the appendix 
201 See for instance Government of Malawi, Ministry of Mines, Natural Resources and Environment, 
Department of Forestry, Standards and Guidelines for Participatory Forestry in Malawi- Improving Forest 
Governance – Improving Rural Livelihoods, Lilongwe, November 2005 
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initiators, and their development logic is meaningful in that it is crucial to the continued 
support and hence life of the project. It also essentially constitutes the logic of existence 
of such departments as the Forestry Department. The Forest Department is itself judged 
by criteria that require them to support this institutionalized Weberian style of 
management, rather than to build on existing, usually informal, community systems with 
higher levels of legitimacy. That is why an English participatory plan was given priority 
over a Chichewa participatory plan, and was found in meso-level offices and not with 
micro-level actors who need it most. This vindicates the assertion that contemporary 
community development is paradoxically, at best, a top-down invitation to bottom-up 
participation within the agents’ development paradigm202. Pure community self-
organization (with autonomy from meso-level institutions) seems to be a rear 
phenomenon. Efforts should therefore be made to find a practical synergy between the 
meso- and micro-levels development concepts and practices. 
5.5 INDIGENOUS AND EXOGENOUS INSTITUTIONS 
INTERFACE: OFFICIAL VS PRACTICAL ROLE OF 
TRADITIONAL LEADERS 
The research findings show a stark difference between the de jure and the de facto roles 
of traditional leaders and their institutions in the management of Sinyala village forest 
area and community development activities in general. Government decentralization 
policy locates traditional leaders as non-voting ex-officio members of all development 
committees in the decentralized governance. Thus, traditional leaders are supposed to 
play an advisory role by virtue of their position in society. The elected members of such 
committees like the VNRMC are the ones who are supposed to make relevant community 
development decisions203.  
However, evidence shows that traditional leaders are very influential in most decisions 
made in community institutions to the extent that no decision is made without their 
knowledge. In some cases, they dictate, assent to, or veto crucial decisions. Evidence 
                                                 
202 See for instance Jacob Aars (2003) Op. Cit. 
203 See chapter 4 
 90  
 
further shows that this traditional authority is quite legitimate at the community level. 
This is evident in the local language terminology and connotations in reference to the 
village headman vis-à-vis community development. Community members refer to the 
village headman as nkhalapakati of development, which connotes a development 
overseer and arbiter having decision making powers. The village headman is also referred 
to as mlangizi which literally means ‘advisor’. However, this sort of ‘advising’, in the 
local culture, connotes an elderly directing ‘children’ on what to do, implying that 
ignoring the chief’s advice is tantamount to insubordination and can be socially punished, 
including losing the chief’s favour in most traditional activities in the village. Almost no-
one who traditionally is under the chief or the village headman, including VNRMC 
members, can risk this social punishment. Thus, practically, at least at community level, 
chiefs are not ex-officio members of development institutions; they are de facto leaders 
with assent and veto powers. This finding is consistent with Michael Schatzberg’s 
analysis of African political legitimacy. He states that the moral matrix of legitimate 
governance in Africa is premised on portrayal of a ruler as a ‘fatherchief’, who has an 
obligation, on the one hand, to make decisions that will facilitate the nourishment and 
nurturing of his ‘family’, and on the other, to punish his ‘children’ when they do wrong 
and pardon them if they truly repent204.  
Further, much as meso-level actors expressed reservation with the unelected traditional 
leaders’ de facto decision making powers and authority at community level, community 
members and micro-level development committee members seemed to accept this 
traditional authority. It came out quite prominently that community members look up to 
the village headman first for direction in many issues that affect them collectively and 
even individually. For instance, one research participant had this to say: 
“When we have a problem, we have nowhere to go for our grievances except to 
the chief”205
                                                 
204 See Michael Schatzberg (2001) Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food 
Bloomington, Indiana University Press 
205 Research participant, Sinyala Joshua FGD 
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Thus, much as most of the indigenous institutions are ‘non-democratic’ in that they are 
not always elected by a popular vote, they are quite legitimate at the community level. As 
Michael Schatzberg puts it, legitimacy is the critical first step in the establishment of any 
accountable regime. He further indicates that democratic constitutions may be codified, 
elections may be free and fair, but they do not suffice; they are empty shells without the 
substance of legitimacy206. Any community development initiative should therefore be 
built on these legitimate institutions if it is to be meaningful among community members. 
The exercise of decision making powers by the traditional leaders in spite of their 
knowledge of their non-voting ex-officio legal status in local governance, signify a clear 
resistance of traditional institutions to the dictates of exogenous institutions. The 
community based forest management approach should have therefore, instead of abruptly 
replacing the legitimate traditional institutions’ decision making power with modern 
democratically elected institutions, explored ways of ‘democratizing’ the traditional 
institutions by improving accountability mechanism. Checks and balances mechanisms 
within the traditional leadership hierarchy and institution of chief’s advisory committees 
could be explored in this regard. Such an approach could gradually lead to a more 
negotiated, legitimate, and democratic community development system than is the case 
now. 
5.6 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS AND 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT SYNERGY 
Research findings reveal that, in most cases, formal community development institutions 
are working merely as a sum of independent institutions and not as a coherent whole. 
Going by the principle that a whole is more than the sum of its parts, we can reasonably 
speculate that the impact of the community development institutional matrix is not 
reaching its potential. As a result, this section is arguing for a coherent community 
development policy that will tie all the pieces together to heighten impact on 
communities. 
                                                 
206 Michael Schatzberg (2001) Ibid 
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As can be seen in figure 5 on page 76, much as the VNRMC is supposed to be a sub-
committee of VDC in community development, it works almost independent of VDC. 
For example, the VNRMC members interviewed indicated that the VDC had never 
invited them to any meeting since the VNRMC was set up in 2003. The VNRMC has 
also never invited the VDC to their meetings. On the other hand, VDC officials indicated 
that since 2003, they had invited the VNRMC members to VDC meetings twice, but no-
one from VNRMC attended. Given the activeness of VNRMC in community 
development in Sinyala, and the fact that both committees meet twice a month and are 
supposed to work closely as one is a sub-committee of the other, the lack of meetings 
between the two committees signify poor feedback mechanism that may result in lack of 
synergy in Sinyala community development. This is crucial if we consider the fact that 
the VDC is the community development overseer and coordinating body at village level 
and is supposed to synergise all development work. Thus, much as the VNRMC and 
VDC are said to be effective in their activities207, the lack of proper consultation and 
feedback between the two development committees has the potential of resulting in 
incoherent community development. In this case, we can argue that the institutions are 
not reaching their potential in coordinating and facilitating community development. 
There is a similar disjoint at the meso-level and between the meso-level and the micro-
level institutions. Evidence shows that the ADC, which is supposed to be the community 
development coordinating body and main development committee for ANRMC and AEC 
sub-committees,  is non-functional in Sinyala at least in as far as community forest 
management is concerned. The ANRMC is non-existent, and members of the AEC work 
directly with communities as independent front line staff of specific ministries and 
government departments208. For example, the forest technical assistant works directly 
with the Sinyala VNRMC and reports to the Forestry Department; the health surveillance 
assistant works directly with the communities and reports to the Health Department; and 
agricultural extension workers work directly with community farmers and report to 
Agriculture Department. These supposedly AEC members do not work as coherent 
members of a technical sub-committee of the ADC as is envisaged in the local 
                                                 
207 Interviews with VNRMC and VDC members and community members 
208 See figure 5 on page 76 
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development institutional framework209. This has sometimes led to duplication of 
activities and inefficient use of resources. For instance, the distribution of fertilizer in 
Sinyala as incentives to community members to participate in Sinyala forest 
management, that was coordinated by the forest technical assistant, could have also 
involved agricultural extension workers who could facilitate the effective use of the 
fertilizer in line with their programmes in the area. This could only happen if this was 
properly planned and coordinated at the AEC and ADC fora, and later at VDC forum. 
Thus, the inactiveness of the ADC, that is supposed to coordinate community 
development, has led to disjointed community development efforts that have a potential 
of being inefficient at the least. 
Thus, some development institutions are inactive and for the ones that are active, they 
operate independent of each other, hence poorly coordinated and inefficient community 
development. There is poor consultation and feedback mechanism among institutions 
both at meso- and micro-level and between the two levels. This might be due to the lack 
of coordinated and coherent community development policy. At the time of the field 
work, the Malawi government was in the process of coming up with a community 
development policy so that development at community level should be coordinated210. 
The ratification and implementation of this policy will go a long way in ensuring 
coordinated community development. 
5.7 BEHAVIORAL IMPLICATIONS IN SINYALA FOREST 
MANAGEMENT 
This section discusses some behavioural implications of the institutional and process 
dynamics in community forest management in Sinyala. The main areas discussed in this 
section are co-management of Sinyala forest between the two villages, Sinyala Group and 
Sinyala Joshua; volunteerism and incentives; and the rising culture of political 
participation and accountability. 
                                                 
209 See figure 3 on page 54 
210 See Chinsinga, B and Kayuni, H. ‘Community Development in Malawi: A Situation Analysis Report’ 
Report Submitted to Skills Development and Income Generation Project, Ministry of Women and Child 
Development Lilongwe, February 2008 
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5.7.1 Co-management as a Two-Level Collective Action Game 
The fact that Sinyala forest is used and managed by two villages makes the problem of 
collective action a two-level game. The first level involves each village, with its own 
internal jurisdiction and institutions, striving to achieve cooperation among the village 
members to effectively manage the forest. The second level involves the two villages 
cooperating to effectively manage the forest. In Sinyala, this situation has brought to light 
some management issues that have their roots in Sinyala historical animosities between 
the two villages. These issues need to be unpacked if we are to understand co-
management in Sinyala forest resources. 
At village level, the issue of ownership plays a big role among village members in each 
village regarding level of involvement in Sinyala forest management. In Sinyala Group 
village, the village members believe that they are the true ownership right holders of 
Sinyala forest apparently because it is largely located within their village boundaries. The 
Sinyala Group villagers claim that they invited the Sinyala Joshua villagers to benefit and 
participate in conservation of Sinyala forest because they are relatives and because 
excluding them would encourage them to encroach in the forest. One Sinyala Group 
research participant had this to say: 
“We (Sinyala Group residents) incorporated them (Sinyala Joshua residents) as 
forest beneficiaries (and in forest management) because we knew if we excluded 
them they would sabotage our forest resource management programme. This is 
from past experience because in 2002 (before the VNRMC was set up) youths 
from Sinyala Joshua cut down our trees and loaded a lot of trees in pick ups 
(cars). We caught them”211
This spirit of ownership gives incentives to Sinyala Group village members to actively 
participate in Sinyala forest resource management. 
                                                 
211 Sinyala Group research participant, FGD 
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“People who work hard at the Sinyala forest is us, from Sinyala Group, I think 
people from Sinyala Joshua undermine us, but you know, what is yours remains 
yours and you cannot give up (in looking after it)”212
On the other hand, the feeling of being secondary owners of Sinyala forest, and that of 
being sidelined by the Group Village Headman and sometimes the VNRMC made some 
Sinyala Joshua village members not to be as enthusiastic in managing Sinyala forest as 
village members from Sinyala Group. Research findings also show that Sinyala Joshua 
village members were the major culprits of free-riding especially when they want to 
benefit from some incentives. 
Given these micro-level collective action problems, the VNRMC has proved to be an 
ideal institution with representation from both villages that has managed in most 
instances to facilitate cooperation in co-managing Sinyala forest. Much as the VNRMC 
has been criticised for having skewed representation213, and sometimes favouring Sinyala 
Group village members in forest management trainings, it represents the best institution 
so far that mobilize village members from both villages to cooperate in managing Sinyala 
forest. Stephan Kroll et al in their experimental investigation actually showed that it is 
easier to reach cooperation agreements in representative groups or committees than at 
individual level in micro-level setting214. The VNRMC therefore presents an ideal second 
level forum where representatives from the two villages, including the influential village 
headmen, meet, consult and share feedback. Given the manageable number of the 
representatives215, it becomes easier to reach consensus and make decisions on how to 
cooperate in managing Sinyala forest. After such agreements, the representatives go back 
to their constituencies and, through the influential village headmen, mobilize village 
members to participate in managing Sinyala forest.  
                                                 
212 Sinyala Group research participant, FGD 
213 See table 2 
214 Stephan Kroll et al  ‘The Prisoner’s Dilemma as a Two-Level Game: An Experimental Investigation’ 
November 1, 2002, http://uwacadweb.uwyo.edu/mason/working.papers/PDTLGEI.pdf (website visited on 
16 December 2008) 
215 The VNRMC is supposed to have 20 members but at the time of the fieldwork, it had 16 members. 
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5.7.2 Low Spirit of Volunteerism and Need for Incentives 
The research findings show that there is low spirit of volunteerism in the management of 
Sinyala forest216. The dwindling spirit of volunteerism and rising culture of dependency 
were also identified by Blessings Chinsinga and Happy Kayuni in their situational 
analysis of community development in Malawi, as issues that need serious consideration 
when formulating Malawi’s community development policy217.  
It can be said in other words that there is no spontaneity in community participation in 
Sinyala forest management. The theory on community self-organization, legitimacy and 
spontaneity can be instructive in offering an explanation for this phenomenon218. It can 
be reasonably argued that, because community based forest management is initiated from 
meso-level institutions, much as it is participatory, it is not endogenous to the micro-level 
societal cultural history and hence cannot at this stage (5 years after inception) command 
the necessary legitimacy to effect spontaneous volunteerism among community members. 
This is compounded by the lack of meaningful engagement with indigenous local 
institutions as discussed above. With time however, and necessary hybridization of 
indigenous and exogenous institutions, communities will be socialized to the ethos of 
community based forest management. 
Need for Incentives 
In the absence of (enough) spontaneous volunteerism, induced incentives become 
necessary to facilitate community participation in such community development activities 
as forest management. In the case of Sinyala forest management, there are two main 
types of incentives: internal and external incentives. 
As presented in chapter 4, internal incentives include the forest management rules and 
regulations administered by the VNRMC such as the allocation of pruned tree branches 
                                                 
216 For a comprehensive presentation of findings on this theme, see chapter 4. 
217 Chinsinga, B and Kayuni, H. (2008) Op. Cit. pp.18-19 
218 These concepts are presented in chapter 2 citing works from such scholars as Louise Comfort (1994) 
Op. Cit.; Francis Heylighen (2008) Op. Cit.; Michael Schatzberg (2001) Op. Cit. and Pierre Englebert 
(2000) Op. Cit. 
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to those who participate in maintaining the forest; and the pledge that only those who 
participate in the forest management will benefit when the forest will be harvested. 
Another incentive that is embedded in Sinyala community culture that findings show 
facilitated most people’s participation is the feeling of shame and possible ostracism in 
the community when one does not participate in communal activities.  
The combined effect of the above internal incentives were said to encourage many people 
to participate in forest management. Analysis shows that these ‘home-grown’ measures 
have the potential of providing sustained incentives for community participation more 
than external incentives that have often been erratic. 
It should however be noted that these internal incentives seemed to work better with 
adults than youths. Research participants from Sinyala Group for instance indicated that 
most youths from Sinyala Joshua hardly participate in maintaining Sinyala forest but 
often free-ride through stealing wood from the forest and benefiting from external 
incentives such as fertilizer219. Evidence also suggests that forestry is indisputably crucial 
to the livelihood of Sinyala residents (and indeed most Malawians) in as far as it provides 
the main source of energy220. However, community forest management was perceived to 
be a cheaper alternative to accessing (or at least hope to access) this forest energy in the 
context that most community members did not have reliable (source of) disposable 
income to buy wood fuel from other sources such as Dzalanyama forest reserve. As 
indicated in chapter 4, those who could afford to buy wood fuel elsewhere were less 
likely to participate in Sinyala forest management. That is why, apart from enough food 
and clean water, having disposable income through such means as small businesses was 
cited as one of the top development needs in Sinyala221. 
In Sinyala, as presented in chapter 4, external incentives included pledges and 
distribution of farm inputs such as seeds, fertilizer, and bee hives to those community 
members who volunteer to work at Sinyala forest. These were donated by such meso-
                                                 
219 Interview with Sinyala Group participants, FGD 
220 See chapter 1 
221 See chapter 4 
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level organizations as the District Assembly, Ministry of Agriculture programmes, 
Integrated Rural Agriculture Development (IRAD) NGO, and the Lilongwe Water Board. 
Findings show that these incentives contributed to the increase in the number of people 
who participated in the management of Sinyala forest222.  
On external incentives, several issues that contributed to the success of the incentives 
need to be highlighted. The most prominent is the need to synergise incentives with 
people’s priority needs. As can be seen in chapter 4, the priority indicator of development 
among community members is enough food. The success of farm inputs incentives in 
Sinyala forest management can therefore be attributed to the fact that the incentives 
directly contributed to the community’s priority need - food security. One community 
member had this to say: 
“If only there was another organization to give us fertilizer, we would have hope 
for enough food and ndiyekuti angatitemere mangolomela223 to work at the 
forest”224
Thus, by solving their food concerns, fertilizer became an effective incentive in 
community participation in Sinyala forest management. The lesson here is that for 
(external) incentives to be effective, an analysis of community members’ needs should be 
made so that the incentives should satisfy the needs priorities. 
It is also interesting to note that external incentives in Sinyala forest management were 
constrained by the induced overlap between Sinyala community member’s needs; the 
interests, logic and paradigms of the external organizations that made the pledges; and the 
interest in community forest management. For instance, The Lilongwe Water Board 
made pledges to Sinyala community because it had interest in the conservation of 
Lilongwe river and Kamuzu Dam of which Sinyala forest forms a catchment area. The 
District Assembly and forest officials facilitated the distribution of fertilizer as an 
                                                 
222 See chapter 4. 
223 This Chichewa metaphor literally means “administering drugs that boost one’s energy”, and is used to 
connote any strong incentive. Here it is used to emphasize that fertilizer incentive will boost people’s 
energy to participate in Sinyala forest management. 
224 Research participant, Sinyala Group FGD 
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incentive to Sinyala forest management because the whole idea of community based 
forest management was hatched within their institutional realm.  
On the other hand, traditional leaders reported that CARE International, one of the 
leading humanitarian international organizations225, donated one bore hole in Sinyala 
area. The Malawi government has also been running a targeted subsidized fertilizer 
programme. However, much as the borehole and the subsidized fertilizer addressed some 
of the community’s top needs (food security and clean water), they did not necessarily act 
as (direct) incentives to community member’s participation in Sinyala forest 
management, let alone any Sinyala community development activity. Much as the bore 
hole and subsidized fertilizer addressed their needs, they were not consciously meant to 
benefit those who participate in Sinyala forest management and to exclude those who do 
not, apparently because CARE International’s and Malawi government’s interests were 
not forest resource management, at least at the time of the drilling of the borehole and the 
distribution of the fertilizer. Thus, external initiatives that satisfy people’s needs are not 
enough to act as incentives in community development activities. They only become 
incentives if the concerned external organization consciously links the ‘donation’ to a 
specific community development activity and manipulate the distribution of the 
‘donation’ to act as carrots and sticks among concerned community members. 
Analysis of external incentives in Sinyala also shows that they are constrained by the 
availability of external organizations and institutions that have an interest in forest 
management and have the resources to use as incentives. Evidence shows that most of the 
external incentives in Sinyala were once off and were only effective at the time of 
administration, after which participation diminished and people started asking for more 
incentives if they were to participate. This indicates that external incentives are not 
reliable as they are not sustainable and they breed the spirit of dependency among 
participating communities. External incentives can therefore only be supported as short 
term measures aimed at igniting the momentum for participation. But much emphasis 
should be put on home-grown internal incentives as they often result in inculcating the 
spirit of self-reliance and are legitimate. 
                                                 
225 See http://www.care.org/ (web visited on 17 December 2008) 
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5.7.3 Prospects for Community Based Forest Management Consolidation: 
Emerging Culture of Participation and Accountability 
One common theme that is running across most findings, especially when respondents 
were expressing dissatisfaction with how different institutions were operating, is the 
growing culture of political participation and demand for accountability among 
community members. For example, interviews with Sinyala Joshua village members 
showed that they were not satisfied with the VNRMC’s feedback mechanism and 
demanded that they needed to be consulted and informed by the committee. The VDC 
officials also indicated they wish they could be consulted on the formation of the 
VNRMC. 
This finding is a manifestation of a maturing participatory culture where people are 
demanding active participation and consultation in issues affecting their lives, and are 
demanding accountability from office holders and decision makers. Going by the 
philosophy of such scholars as Amartya Sen, political participation is one of the 
constitutive components of development. As indicated in chapter 4, meso-level 
institutions also conceptualized (community) development as people’s participation in 
issues affecting their lives. At least at development process level therefore, it can be 
argued that people’s demand for participation and accountability is the right direction 
towards legitimate development. Much as this growing participatory culture cannot 
confidently be attributed (only) to the democratic institutions set up under the local 
governance rubric, it holds the promise for the consolidation and legitimacy of these 
institutions in the near future. 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed, and drawn insights from, the Sinyala case using the collective 
action and local governance theoretical framework. The chapter has shown that the 
introduction of community based forest management did not adequately engage with 
local indigenous institutions and that this caused some incompatibilities and 
discontinuities between the formal institutions and the indigenous local institutions. The 
 101  
 
chapter has also shown that most community development institutions and actors are 
disjointed and this has led to community development that is not properly coordinated 
and synergized. Given the exogenous nature of community based forest management 
regime, much as it was participatory, it has also been argued that the need for incentives 
will remain an issue. However, internal home-grown incentives should be prioritised as 
they have long-term effects, breed self-reliance and are sustainable. Analysis also shows 
the emerging culture of political participation and accountability among community 
members that holds the promise for consolidation of democratic and legitimate 
institutions in community development. 
As a matter of conclusion, the next chapter articulates these insights and lessons and 
highlight their implication for community collective action and decentralized community 
development. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE ACTION 
AND DEVELOPMENT IN A DECENTRALIZED REGIME 
This chapter concludes this research paper by drawing insights and presenting them with 
the aim of highlighting some key implications for community collective action and 
development in a decentralized set-up. 
This paper has shown that the introduction of community based forest management in 
Sinyala by the Malawi government through the Department of Forest did not adequately 
take into consideration the historical and socio-cultural institutional and behavioral 
factors of Sinyala community. For example, the institution of traditional leadership was 
accorded the status of non-voting ex-officio member when in reality traditional leaders 
legitimately make, assent to, and even veto decisions at community level regarding many 
community development issues, including the community based forest management. The 
introduction of the community based forest management system also replaced the 
indigenous and endogenous forest patrol committee with the exogenous VNRMC.  
Much as the process of introducing community based forest management in Sinyala used 
some participatory methodologies, it was to a large extent implementation of a pre-
determined project in line with the logic and paradigm of the meso-level institutions (and 
by extension, macro-level institutions) of the Malawi government and the project donors. 
The Malawi government, for instance, justified the introduction of community based 
forest management in Sinyala (and indeed all VFAs in Malawi) on the basis that 
community members perceived village forest as ‘ownerless’. Transfer of ownership of 
village forest from Malawi government to Sinyala community and setting up community 
forest governance institutions within the local governance institutional framework (e.g. 
VNRMC) was therefore at the heart of community based forest management. Empirical 
evidence however shows that Sinyala community members have been claiming 
ownership of the forest since 1922 when they settled at Sinyala, and have attempted to set 
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up their own indigenous forest governance institutions – which the Malawi government 
ignored and replaced during the introduction of the community based forest management 
in 2003.  
As a result, the Sinyala community development process, at least in as far as community 
forestry is concerned, was characterized by incompatibilities and discontinuities between 
the indigenous community governance institutions and community expectations on the 
one hand, and the formal micro- and meso-level governance institutions and logic on the 
other. For example, traditional leaders held the de facto assent and veto powers in many 
community development decisions (including in the VNRMC) despite the fact that the 
formal local governance institution accorded them a non-voting ex-officio status. 
Evidence also shows that, after the introduction of the community based forest 
management, Sinyala community members showed less spontaneous self-organization 
spirit and needed more (external) incentives to participate than before.  
This community development institutional and behavioral disequilibrium is compounded 
by the fact that local governance institutions and development change agents are 
disjointed in spite of the seemingly coherent local governance institutional matrix. For 
instance, despite having the ADC as the coordinating forum, government front line staff 
from different departments operate at community level independent of each other and 
report directly to their respective departments without any coordination effort at the 
ADC. This has resulted in poorly coordinated community development, characterized by 
duplication of efforts and inconsistencies. 
Thus, much as the introduction of community based forest management was said to be 
participatory, it remains starkly exogenous and lacking in legitimacy to the extent that it 
fails to adequately engage and in some instances replaces local enduring governance 
institutions. This in turn has resulted in increased need for external incentives to induce 
community members to participate in community forest management and many other 
community development activities. However, the external incentives have been erratic 
owing to the fact that there have been few organizations with enough resources whose 
interests in Sinyala community overlap with those of Sinyala community members within 
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the forest resource management realm. In addition, the Community Development and 
Forest Departments, whose logic of existence and funding partly depends on the 
sustainability of (Sinyala) community based forest management project, have few 
resources to sustain the inducements. This leaves home-grown system of punishment and 
rewards as the only long term credible and sustainable incentive. More importantly, it has 
been shown that home-grown incentive system in community development increases 
legitimacy, spontaneity, self-reliance and effectiveness of community development 
activities. This however does not mean that communities should be cut off from meso- or 
macro-level policies and agents, but that, community development efforts, be it catalyzed 
by external agents or purely self-organized, should aim at sparking organic processes by 
adequately building on existing community institutions and initiatives. 
6.1 RECOMMENDATIONS: IMPROVING COMMUNITY 
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE 
DECENTRALIZED FRAMEWORK 
Based upon the findings of this research therefore, the following recommendations are 
made for decentralized local governance to improve collective action and development at 
community level. These recommendations should be considered as complementary, and 
not as independent strategies, if they are to have maximum impact: 
6.1.1 Engage with and Build on existing Indigenous Institutions 
In community development, especially in a decentralized framework where there is need 
to devolve most decision making powers on community development to local levels 
while at the same time harmonizing any development process and outcome at micro-level 
with macro- and meso-level strategic plans, it is imperative that any development 
initiative, be it catalyzed by external agents or demand driven, should engage with and 
build on existing indigenous institutions. As this research paper has shown, failure to 
acknowledge, and sensitively employ traditional (indigenous) institutions can lead to the 
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failure of decentralization and community development initiatives226. For instance, in the 
Sinyala case, the community based forest management approach should not have 
(abruptly) replaced traditional leaders’ legitimate decision making status with modern 
democratically elected institutions. Instead, there was a need for a negotiated approach 
where, for instance, the formal and informal institutions would be allowed to explore 
ways of ‘democratizing’ the traditional institutions by improving home-grown 
accountability mechanisms. Checks and balances within the traditional leadership 
hierarchy and the institution of chief’s advisory committees could be explored in this 
regard and possibly be supplemented with new democratic institutions.  
Similarly, the Sinyala (indigenous) patrol committee would not have been disbanded and 
replaced with a more literate and democratically elected VNRMC. Instead, there was a 
need for exploring accountability mechanism of the indigenous committee, the 
recruitment process and how to build the capacity of the existing committee. 
Such a negotiated approach could gradually lead to a more legitimate, democratic and 
effective community development system than was the case at the time of the field 
research. 
6.1.2 Need for Relevant Internal Incentives 
Evidence shows that there is a need for appropriate incentive system to increase 
participation of community members in such community development initiatives as the 
Sinyala community based forest management. The need for effective incentive system is 
high because such community development initiatives are externally influenced and often 
ignore similar organic initiatives. For incentives to be effective, they need to be 
synergized with internal community needs. This lesson is drawn from such instances in 
Sinyala as when farm input distribution acted as an effective incentive to community 
participation in forest management because the farm input addressed one of the 
community’s top livelihood need – food security. 
                                                 
226 See also Weitz as cited in Damien Kingsbury (2004) Op. Cit. p.223 
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The inconsistent external incentives in Sinyala however points to the fact that external 
incentives cannot reliably sustain community development. This, plus success stories 
from Sinyala endogenous efforts of managing their forest resources, point to the need for 
emphasizing on home-grown (endogenous) incentive mechanisms. Thus, once micro-
level governance institutions are organically put in place, they need to devise relevant 
internal punishment and rewards mechanisms to incentivize community member 
participation. If community development is approached from the perspective of 
engagement and building on existing indigenous institutions227, the task of 
institutionalizing relevant and appropriate incentive mechanism is likely to be easy. This 
is because the emerging governance structure can adapt such indigenous lock-in 
mechanisms as the spirit of reciprocity (embedded in the philosophy of Umunthu and 
manifested in such systems as Thangata228), the feeling of shame when one is not 
involved in communal obligations, ostracism, and traditional authority fines for those 
who break community rules. 
In this context, external incentives can only be promoted as short term measures aimed at 
igniting the momentum for participation. Much emphasis should be put on home-grown 
endogenous incentives as they are often legitimate and can easily result in spontaneous 
self-organization and self-reliance. 
6.1.3 Build and Strengthen Cross-Community Institutions Where CPRs 
Overlap At Least Two Communities 
The Sinyala experience shows the problems that can arise when the CPR is shared by two 
or more communities. It further shows that this necessitates cross-community and/or 
meso-level institutions. In spite of all cooperation problems, many stemming from past 
animosities between the two Sinyala villages, the VNRMC, as a governance institution 
with representation from both villages, represent the best co-management forum so far 
where cooperation in micro-level development in such scenarios can be enhanced. As 
                                                 
227 See section 6.1.1 
228 The philosophy of Umunthu or Ubuntu hinges on the belief that ‘I am because we are’ hence gives the 
feeling of obligation towards others and the community (see for instance Mogobe Ramose (1999) African 
Philosophy Through Ubuntu, Harare, Mond Books); For a brief explanation of the Thangata system, see 
section 1.1.2. 
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discussed in this paper, it is easier to reach cooperation agreements at a cross-community 
or meso-level forum with legitimate and democratic representation from micro-level 
communities than it is at the individual level in micro-level setting. This can easily be 
conceived if we analyze such co-management scenario as a two-level collective action 
game229. 
6.1.4 Need for implementation of Coherent Community Development Policy 
There is a need for coordination of governance institutions between and within different 
levels of local governance from the community level to the meso-level, and, by 
extension, to the macro-level. For example, front line staff of different government 
departments working in the community development realm need to work under the rubric 
of the local governance institutions as coordinated at different levels of development 
governance such as the District Assembly, ADC and the VDC. It is therefore imperative 
to have a Community Development Policy that will give a coherent guidance to 
community development. This synergized approach to community development is likely 
to bring about better efficiency and effectiveness of community development initiatives 
than the disjointed and duplicated initiatives observed at the time of this research study. 
6.2 CONCLUSION 
This paper is far from being exhaustive. It has however shown that the introduction of 
Sinyala community based forest management took little consideration of existing 
indigenous institutions – a factor that resulted in problematic implementation dynamics 
especially due to incompatibilities and discontinuities between the indigenous and the 
exogenous institutions. 
However, it should be noted that the community based forest management system was 
just five years old in Sinyala at the time of this research; that institutional evolution 
process can take a lot of time; and that some benefits of this community based 
management were yet to be fully realized by the community members. The findings also 
                                                 
229 See section 5.7.1 
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show a growing culture of political participation and accountability among community 
members. These factors point to prospects for an eventual equilibrium especially when 
the influence of indigenous institutions is acknowledged, community members’ 
development expectations are taken into consideration, and when the meso- and micro-
level institutional coordination is improved. 
To improve community collective action and development within a decentralized 
framework therefore, this research paper has argued for the need to engage with and build 
on existing indigenous institutions; provide relevant and appropriate incentives to boost 
community participation; build and strengthen cross-community governance institutions 
where a CPR overlaps two or more communities; and implement a coherent community 
development policy that will synergize community development efforts from different 
actors at all levels of governance. Much as these principles might not be generalizable in 
all instances of community development, they provide insights for improving community 
development in at least similar cases to Sinyala. 
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APPENDICES 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDES 
 
Interview with Officials 
 
• Development vision 
o What do you intend to achieve in community development? 
o What do you think are the critical aspects of this community 
development? 
o What do community members need to survive? 
o How do forest resources contribute to community development?  
o How do you rate forest resources in community development (ask them to 
rank) 
 
• History of Sinyala Community Forest 
 
o Tell me the history of Sinyala Community forest? 
o How big is it? 
o How do communities benefit from the forest? 
o How many villages benefit from the forest? 
o What have been the threats to Sinyala community forest? 
o What was your department’s role in the management of the forest prior to 
decentralization policy (1996)? 
 
• What is your department’s role in the management of Sinyala forest after 1996? 
 
o What does management of Sinyala community forest entail? 
o What structures are put in place to effectively manage the forest resources 
o (which structures are at district level and which ones at local level?) 
o How do the structures operate? (Explore interaction of structures at micro- 
and meso-levels) 
o Tell me how you plan this management 
o Who participate in planning the resource management? How? 
o How is the role of community members in management of these 
community resources? 
 
• Assessing effectiveness of the interface between indigenous and formal 
governance institutions in forest resource management 
 
o  How would you assess the effectiveness of the management system of 
Sinyala forest resource (both at local and district level)? 
o What are the challenges that you face in managing the forest resources if 
any? 
o How have you solved these challenges? 
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o What lessons would you draw from your involvement in managing the 
forest resources 
o What would you suggest to improve forest resource management in 
Sinyala? 
o How was the forest resources managed before the introduction of VDCs 
and ADCs? 
o How do you compare forest management system before institution of 
VDCs and after? 
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Interview with Community Gatekeepers 
 
• Development vision 
o What do you think is the goal of community development? 
o What do you think are the critical aspects of this community 
development? 
o What do community members need to survive? 
o How do forest resources contribute to community development?  
o How do you rate forest resources in community development (ask them to 
rank) 
 
• History of Sinyala Community Forest 
 
o Tell me the history of your community. 
o Tell me the history of Sinyala community forest. 
o How big is it? 
o How do communities benefit from the forest? 
o How many villages benefit from the forest? 
o What have been the threats to Sinyala community forest? 
o What was your role in the management of the forest prior to 
decentralization policy (1996)? 
o What have been the challenges (if any) in managing the forest resources? 
o How have you resolved these challenges? 
 
• What is your role in the management of Sinyala forest after 1996? 
 
o What structures are put in place in your community to effectively manage 
the forest resources 
o How are the structures constituted? (elections…etc) 
o How do the structures operate? (planning, implementation, 
evaluation…etc) 
 
• Co-management 
 
o How do you coordinate with neighboring villages that use Sinyala forest 
resource? 
o Who participate in planning management of the forest resources? How? 
o What is your role in the co-management of the forest resources? 
o What is the role of the community members in the management of the 
forest resources? 
o What are the challenges in co-managing the forest resources with 
neighboring villages if any? 
o How do you overcome the challenges? 
o What would you suggest to be the best way of co-managing the forest 
resources with neighboring villages? 
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o How was the forest resources co-managed before the introduction of 
VNRMC, VDCs and ADCs? 
o How do you compare forest co-management system before institution of 
VNRMC/VDCs/ADCs and after? 
 
• Meso- and Micro-level institutional interface 
 
o Tell me about the relationship between VNRMC, the Village 
Development Committee (VDC) and the Area Development Committee 
(ADC)? 
o How was the VNRMC initiated? 
o How is the VNRMC constituted? 
o How is the VDC constituted? 
o How is the ADC constituted? 
o What is the role of VNRMC in forest resource management? 
o What is the role of the VDC in forest resource management? 
o What is the role of the ADC in forest resource management? 
o How does the NNRMC, the VDC and the ADC relate to District structures 
in forest resource management? 
o What are the challenges if any in the relationships between 
• VNRMC and VDC 
• VDC and ADC 
• ADC and District structures 
o How are these challenges resolved? 
o How was the forest resources managed before the introduction of VDCs 
and ADCs? 
o How do you compare forest management system before institution of  
VNRMC / VDCs and after institution of these structures? 
 
• Assessing effectiveness of the interface between indigenous and formal 
governance institutions in forest resource management 
 
o  How would you assess the effectiveness of the management system of the 
Sinyala forest resource (both at local and district level) 
o What are the challenges that you face in managing the forest resources if 
any? 
o How have you solved these challenges? 
o What lessons would you draw from your involvement in managing the 
forest resources 
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Interview with Community Members 
 
• Development vision 
o What do you think is the goal of community development? 
o What do you think are the critical aspects of this community 
development? 
o What do (you) community members need to survive? 
o How do forest resources contribute to community development?  
o How do you rate forest resources in community development (ask them to 
rank) 
 
• History of Sinyala Community Forest 
 
o Tell me the history of your community 
o Tell me the history of Sinyala community forest 
o How big is it? 
o How do communities benefit from the forest? 
o How many villages benefit from the forest? 
o What have been the threats to Sinyala community forest? 
o What was your role in the management of the forest prior to 
decentralization policy (1996)? 
o What have been the challenges (if any) in managing the forest resources? 
o How have you resolved these challenges? 
 
 
• What is your role in the management of Sinyala forest after 1996? 
 
o What structures are put in place in your community to effectively manage 
the forest resources? 
o How are the structures constituted? (elections…etc) 
o How do the structures operate? (planning, implementation, 
evaluation…etc) 
 
• Co-management 
 
o How do you coordinate with neighboring villages that use Sinyala forest 
resource? 
o Who participate in planning management of the forest resources? How? 
o What is your role in the co-management of the forest resources? 
o What are the challenges in co-managing the forest resources with 
neighboring villages if any? 
o How do you overcome the challenges? 
o What would you suggest to be the best way of co-managing the forest 
resources with neighboring villages? 
o How was the forest resources co-managed before the introduction of 
VNRMC, VDCs and ADCs? 
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o How do you compare forest resources co-management system before 
institution of VNRMC/VDCs/ADCs and after? 
 
• Meso- and Micro-level institutional interface 
 
o Tell me about the relationship between the VNRMC, Village 
Development Committee (VDC) and the Area Development Committee 
(ADC)? 
o How is the VNRMC constituted? 
o How is the VDC constituted? 
o How is the ADC constituted? 
o What is the role of the VDC in forest resource management? 
o What is the role of the VDC in forest resource management? 
o What is the role of the ADC in forest resource management? 
o How does the VNRMC, the VDC and the ADC relate to District structures 
in forest resource management? 
o What are the challenges if any in the relationships between 
• VNRMC and VDC 
• VDC and ADC 
• ADC and District structures 
o How are these challenges resolved? 
o How was the forest resources managed before the introduction of 
VNRMC, VDCs and ADCs? 
o How do you compare forest management system before institution of 
VNRMC/VDCs and after? 
 
• Assessing effectiveness of the interface between indigenous and formal 
governance institutions in forest resource management 
 
o  How would you assess the effectiveness of the management system of the 
Sinyala forest resource (both at local and district level) 
o What are the challenges that you face in managing the forest resources if 
any? 
o How have you solved these challenges? 
o What lessons would you draw from your involvement in managing the 
forest resources 
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SINYALA PARTICIPATORY FOREST MANAGEMENT PLAN – DOCUMENT 
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